Congress and the Territorial Expansion of the United States

Nolan M. McCarty
Columbia University

Keith T. Poole
Carnegie-Mellon University

Howard Rosenthal
Princeton University

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1. Introduction

There has been a renewed emphasis in political science in the role of institutions in shaping political outcomes. This emphasis has led many scholars to the tougher question of how institutions, so prized for their durability and predictability, do in fact undergo fundamental transformations.

The entry of new states into the American Union is one process by which our political institutions have undergone radical changes. Apart from changes in the terms of the Constitution through amendment and judicial decision, few processes have altered the political terrain of the United States as much as the process of adding new land and people. Between 1789 and 1912 the United States expanded from a union of 13 former British colonies to 48 states filling the center of the North American continent (see table 1A).[1] All but 3 of the 48 contiguous states had entered by 1896. These changes were instrumental not only in enhancing the power of the national state, but also in reallocating power within it.

Table 1 about here

The politics of statehood lies squarely within the legislative domain. Article IV, section 3, of the Constitution gives Congress the authority to add new states to the Union with only the restriction that they not be carved out of existing states without their consent.

The exercise of this authority is in many ways similar to the acceptance of new partners in a business or legal partnership.[2] A new partner is entitled to a share of profits, diluting the return of existing partners. Similarly, in congressional politics, the entry of new states changes the allocation of seats in both Houses. This dilutes the power of all existing states. This fact should make all existing states reluctant to take in new members. On the other hand, a new partner has the capacity to increase the total profits of the firm, increasing the return to existing partners. Analogously, the loss of power to existing states might not deter accepting new members if "Manifest Destiny" brought scale economies and continental power advantages to the union. How the partnership decision relates to profits is shaped by the exit options of the potential partner. Even if adding the partner diluted profits, profits might be even lower were the candidate to join another firm. A candidate state might likewise set up shop on its own (Texas) or engage in disliked behaviors that could be bargained away in a statehood negotiation (Utah).

The business partnership analogy should not be carried too far, however. In a pure partnership model, all actors have a common interest in maximizing the present value of the firm. Thus the decision is likely to turn mainly around "efficiency" considerations. But statehood decisions also have important distributive implications that are not easily bargained out by compensating side payments. Some of these distributive implications may be narrowly economic. A potential entrant may be a complement to the economy of one state but a competitor to another. A potential entrant may be expected to be relatively poor for some time, a likely ally for those states inclined to support government policies that redistribute via taxation, spending, and regulation. Interest may also diverge over issues, such as the extension of slavery, that are as much a question of

ideological preference as economic interests.[3] On these distributive issues, the congressional delegation of an entrant may be a potential ally or an enemy of an individual member of Congress. Thus, in our own times, Democrats are eager to see the District of Columbia represented in Congress but Republicans are opposed.

Our central hypothesis is that the distributive aspects of statehood dominate those factors that push all members to take a common position on statehood. Rather than view institutional change as a mechanism to promote efficiency, we argue that how statehood changes the political balance in the short run is the key to understanding when and which new states are added to the Union. Thus we also hypothesize that the entry of new states is likely to create a great deal of conflict within Congress.

The roll call voting record of Congress is our main source of data for investigating this hypothesis of distributive or ideological conflict. We emphasize "ideology" because economic and non-economic issues are highly bundled. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) show that the conflict expressed in most votes, regardless of the underlying policy issues, can be accounted for by a single dimension (e.g., liberal-conservative). Consequently, we further hypothesize that members of Congress are likely to judge a new entrant by how its congressional delegation is likely to locate on this dimension. Indeed, we will show that conflicts over entry always relate to the important political issues of each era.

We focus on the politics of entry in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Until the Civil War, the dominant political issue was slavery (Weingast, 1991). Subsequently, entry was determined by the Republicans' objective of maintaining the policies they enacted during the War and Reconstruction (Stewart and Weingast, 1992).

The major economic issues that pitted industrial versus agricultural interests were also important factors in the "admission politics" of this era.

We argue that patterns of settlement influenced the demand for statehood by the territories while national political controversies determined the federal government's willingness to grant statehood. Demand certainly had an important endogenous component that reflected policies adopted by Congress. Settlement, for example, was affected by the terms of sale of public lands and the subsidies afforded to railroads. But much was exogenous. Settlements in Texas and California took place on foreign lands. The supply of settlers was affected by fertility in New England, war and pestilence in Europe, the world price of cotton, etc. The uncertainty of the "demand side" often worked to undermine the ability of political actors to use statehood to promote their goals. This was true for ante-bellum attempts at regional balance as well as post-bellum attempts to establish Republican hegemony. To support our claims, we analyze the politics of statehood from the perspective of the spatial model of Congressional voting (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). We establish that roll call voting on statehood and related issues map onto the partisan and regional cleavages that defined congressional coalitions in each relevant era.

2. Land Tenure and the Formation of States

The European settlers in the North American British colonies took it for granted that they could move inland to the west at will and settle there. The form of land tenure[4]

in the British colonies was much freer than in England because of the simple necessity of attracting colonists. By the time of the Revolution the prevailing form of land tenure was *free and common socage* or what is referred to in more modern language as *title in fee simple*. This was, in effect, the modern form of land ownership free of the old feudal burdens.[5] The land owner could freely sell his land, pass it to his heirs, cut down the trees or dig up the minerals on the land, and so on.[6] Land quickly became a commodity that was bought and sold for profit rather than a family estate that was preserved for one's heirs (Carstensen, 1963; Harris, 1970).

One of the most important questions the victorious revolutionaries faced was how to dispose of the public lands belonging to (or claimed by) the newly sovereign states. Thomas Jefferson provided the answer in the great Land Ordinances of 1785 and 1787. He viewed the government's tenure as being fee-simple. Consequently, the government could transfer that fee-simple title to a private buyer through a sale. Jefferson's system was a model of simplicity. The land would be properly surveyed and sold at public auction.

The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 banned slavery from the territory north of the Ohio River and embraced Jefferson's basic scheme. By 1793, all the territory from the Alleghenies to the Mississippi was, at least in theory, organized according to Jefferson's principles.

One of these principles covered entry to the union. When enough settlers had occupied an area of formerly public lands, those territories would be eligible to become new states on an equal basis with the older states. Because the norm for eligibility was

sufficient population to reach the current quota for a House seat, new entrants were almost always very thinly populated.

The low population threshold meant that most of the concern about how entry would modify the ideological or partisan balance pertained to the Senate. Each entrant could elect two senators. When Vermont entered in 1791, the Senate expanded significantly, from 26 to 28 members. The entry of Arizona and New Mexico was still a substantial expansion, from 92 to 96. Additions to the House were proportionately much smaller. Table 1B shows the additions, in the year of each reapportioned Congress (those elected in years ending in 2), represented by states admitted in the previous decade. Typically, the new entrants had even fewer representatives than senators. Only once did new states' representatives outnumber new states' senators, by 1.33 to 1, yet the House always had at least twice as many members as the Senate. In the short run, new states would have only a marginal effect on the composition of the House. In contrast, they had an immediate impact on the Senate.

From the very beginning the entry of new states was caught up in the major political conflict of the existing union. The 1789 to 1912 era can be broken up into three clear periods. First, the ante-bellum period to 1861 during which balance between the slave and free states in the Senate influenced the status quo on slavery. Second, from the beginning of the Civil War in 1861 through 1890. During this period the Republicans selectively admitted 11 new states (Stewart and Weingast, 1992). This strategy was designed to ensure their ability to preserve the post–Civil War status quo by controlling the Senate even if the Democrats succeeded in capturing the House of Representatives and the presidency (Stewart, 1990). As we shall see, the economic interests of these new

states and the rise of populism partially undermined this strategy. Third, the period between 1896 and 1912, which saw the entry of four states previously denied admission.

3. Slavery and the Balance of Political Power: 1789 - 1861

The admission of new states during the ante-bellum period was tied to the conflict over slavery, an issue that was compromised but not resolved at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Both the compromise and the potential for tension on the issue were clearly evident in the provision that apportioned the House of Representatives on the basis of the Caucasian population plus *three-fifths* of all Negroes and Indians. Although slavery was clearly left at the discretion of the states by the Constitution, the Constitution could be amended by a two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress plus ratification by 3/4 of the states. Nevertheless, and this is the key to the slavery controversy, the Constitution explicitly prohibits amendments that would deprive a state of its seats in the Senate![7] In other words, no matter how few people live in a state, it retains its two seats in the Senate. Hence, as long as there were as many slave states as free states, slavery could never be abolished.

Even though the 3/5 clause advantaged the white population in the South, the population balance favored the free states in the House of Representatives (the slave states *never* had a majority of House seats). Thus the South's best hope lay in preserving parity in the Senate. Consequently, the admission of each new free state was typically compensated by the admission of a slave state (see table 1).

Weingast (1991) argues that the North had to make a credible commitment to the South via the "balance" rule, under which one slave state was admitted for every free state, preserving the South's veto power with regard to slavery.[8] In fact, he argues that the admission of California as an uncompensated free state in 1850 broke this commitment and precipitated the Civil War a decade later. In later work, Weingast (1998) also emphasizes that the loss of House seats by the Northern Democrats in the 1854 elections made it impossible to balance California with Kansas.

Our view of the role of "balance" is more nuanced. Between 1790 and 1860, Southern demands for balance were probably increasing. In the last decade of the eighteenth century and the first of the nineteenth, northern abolitionist pressure on the South was virtually absent. Northern states were still adopting post-nati emancipation, freeing only children of slaves, during this period. Slavery was fully abolished in New York, for example, only in 1827 (Freehling, 1990, p. 133). With the gradual abolition of slavery in the North, abolitionists increasingly took the fight directly to the South, including attempts at mass mailings of propaganda. A second, more debatable, factor affecting Southern demand for a guarantee was fear of slave revolts in the South. Consequently, we see Southern demand for balance as increasing almost continuously, consistent with the steadily increasing appearance of slavery as a distinct issue dimension in congressional roll call voting during the 1830s and 1840s (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997, chapter 5).

A more direct indication that balance was not initially needed as part of a credible commitment is that Ohio was admitted as a non-compensated free state in 1803 under a Southern president, Thomas Jefferson. Ohio was compensated by Louisiana only 9 years

later, in 1812. Balance was maintained for the next 8 years by admitting 2 slave states and 2 free states. This balance proved impossible to maintain when Missouri applied for admission in 1818.

Alabama's petition for statehood was already under consideration when Missouri applied for statehood. Alabama was clearly going to enter as a slave state and it was admitted in December 1819. The admission of Alabama as the twenty-second state produced an even balance of 11 free and 11 slave states.

a. Missouri and the Emergence of the Balance Rule

The problem Missouri posed was that, although it was not a Deep South cotton producer, it had a large enough slave population (16.4%) to cause slavery proponents to seek its admission as a slave state. (Missouri's 16.4% slave population was smaller than any of the 11 slave states.)[9] Missouri was sufficiently populated to seek admission, but there was no other newly settled area that could enter as a free state. The next states to be admitted, Arkansas and Michigan, entered 15 years later. They were virtually unpopulated in 1820 -- 8,896 in Michigan and 14,273 in Arkansas. No state had been admitted (or was ever admitted) with a population this small. The remainder of the territory of the U.S. in 1820 was essentially uninhabited by Caucasians.

Admitting Missouri as an uncompensated slave state would unbalance the Senate 12 to 11 in favor of slavery. Opponents of the entry of Missouri also voiced concerns about its entry on the balance in the House, particularly in light of the South's ability to draw advantage from the three-fifths clause. But these concerns were probably largely rhetoric. Missouri's slave population was small. The state entered with only one House

seat. Four decades later, at the outbreak of the Civil War, its delegation had risen to seven—still smaller than, say, Indiana's 11. In any event, an increasingly strident abolitionist movement intensified concerns about the balance of power.

The North's legislative attack on Missouri slavery came in the House. In February 1819, amendments by Tallmadge of New York passed in nearly purely sectional votes (see figure 1 and table 2). These amendments would have banned future imports of slaves into Missouri and freed all slave children in Missouri born after 1825. The North in fact enjoyed a two-vote edge in the Senate at the time, as Alabama had not yet entered. But the amendments failed in the Senate when a unanimous South was joined by 5 northern defectors, including two from Illinois, where slavery was present in the form of black apprenticeships (Freehling, 1990, p. 149).

Figure 1 and Table 2 about here

At the time of voting on Missouri, slavery represented the principal conflict found in congressional politics. Later statehood votes also reflect the major lines of conflict of their historical periods. We quantify how the inclusion of new states reflects congressional politics by examining roll call voting in the House and Senate. The model used is the spatial model of voting (Enelow and Hinich, 1984) estimated by the D-NOMINATE model of Poole and Rosenthal (1991, 1997).

In the spatial model, each legislator is represented as a point on an ideological map. For example, a map might have two dimensions. Left-right on the map might represent economic liberals vs. economic conservatives, up-down might represent pro-slavery vs. anti-slavery. Not only legislators but also roll calls are represented on this

map. Two points represent each roll call. One corresponds to the outcome identified with a "Yea" vote; the other to the outcome identified with a "Nay" vote. Each legislator votes probabilistically over the two outcomes, the probabilities being functions of the distances between the legislator and the outcomes. A legislator who is much closer to the Yea outcome than to the Nay outcome votes Yea with a probability close to 1.0. A legislator who is exactly equidistant from the Yea and Nay outcomes votes Yea with probability 0.5. The D-NOMINATE method, basically, provides maximum likelihood estimates of the legislator and roll call points.

Poole and Rosenthal found that two dimensions were sufficient to describe roll call voting behavior through American history. The first--horizontal in the figures that follow--dimension always is far more important than the second, vertical dimension. The first dimension accounts for about 83% of the individual decisions. The second dimension adds another 2 or 3%.[10] All figures used in this paper come from a simultaneous estimation using all 8,110,702 individual voting decisions in the House from 1789 to 1985 and 2,317,915 decisions in the Senate for the same period.

The vote depicted in figure 1 is on the Tallmadge motion to free all newly born slaves in Missouri on their 25th birthday. The tokens represent the legislators; Rs denote members of the Jeffersonian Republican Party and Fs members of the Federalist Party. The line is the "cutting line" for the roll call, the perpendicular bisector of the line joining the Yea and Nay outcomes. Legislators to the right of the cutting line are "predicted" to vote anti-slavery, those to the left, pro-slavery.

Shading shows the actual votes. In this and other figures, an actual "Yea" vote is shaded dark gray and a "Nay" vote shaded black. The classification errors are represented

by black tokens to the right of the cutting line and gray tokens to the left. Because the voting model is one in which probabilities depend on distances between legislator points and outcomes, errors should be most likely among nearly "indifferent" voters close to the cutting line. This is in fact the case for the Tallmadge motion.

The geographic distribution of the vote is also shown in the figure. The shading for "Yea" and "Nay" votes is identical to figure 1a. Congressional districts in light gray represent non-voters. Striped states had delegations elected at-large. White areas of a state represent unsettled land.

We also present statehood roll call vote outcomes in tabular form. Table 2 illustrates a typical table.[11] The column labeled "Margin" contains the total vote breakdown. To facilitate comparison across roll calls, the vote in support of a position, such as anti-slavery, appears first for every roll call. Thus the first number is not always the "Yea" votes. The columns contain the same breakdowns for the major political parties. The second-to-last column shows the classification errors for the spatial model--figuratively, the number of tokens on the wrong side of the cutting line. The next-to-last column contains a summary measure of fit, the Proportionate Reduction in Error. In the PRE, the classification errors are benchmarked relative to the total number of votes cast for the minority position on the roll call. For example, in the last row of table 2, PRE = 1 -5/66 = 0.92. When there are no classification errors, PRE=1. When there are as many classification errors as minority votes, PRE=0.

The vote on post-nati emancipation in Missouri shown in figure 1 took place in an atypical period of American history, one without a strong two-party system (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997, chapter 5). This period was the "Era of Good Feelings" commonly seen

as lasting from 1815 -- the end of the Napoleonic Wars and their North American offshoot, the War of 1812 -- to 1822. The country had been badly divided over siding with Britain or France and over the economic program of Alexander Hamilton. The Republicans, triumphant in the presidency with Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe from 1801 to 1824, had moved toward Hamilton's ideas, and the foreign policy conflict was settled. Only a single electoral vote was cast against Monroe's reelection to the presidency in 1820. In the 16th House, which passed the Missouri Compromise, the Jeffersonian Republicans held over 85 percent of the seats.

Moreover, as can be seen in figures 1-4, the parties were not well differentiated ideologically. There are no distinct clusters of R and F tokens, although the Federalists, more represented in the North, were more to the "right" end of the spectrum. On most issues, voting had no ideological structure. But votes on slavery, and especially, slavery related to the inclusion of new states, were highly structured. In fact, figures 1 and 2 show that slavery votes were votes on the first dimension. That is, they were votes on the principal dimension of political conflict in this period, which is largely a North-South vote, as can be seen in the geographic maps in figures 1 and 2.

In the "Era of Good Feelings", party itself does not predict roll call voting particularly well. As seen in table 2, the parties themselves were badly split internally on Missouri. In contrast, the spatial model of voting accurately picks up the internal North-South divisions of the parties. There are relatively few classification errors. Table 2 illustrates two important points about the inclusion of new states:

- The table shows that voting on slavery in the 15th Congress centered on the two vital issues that were to come up time and again until the Civil War. One was the South's interest in forcing free states to capture and return fugitive or runaway slaves. The other was that slavery in territories about to become states had, as we have seen, enormous implications for the distribution of political power in the country. The fugitive slave law votes in 1818 fit the model well, and the Missouri-Arkansas votes in 1819 fit exceptionally well. The inclusion of new states was the central issue in American politics at this time.
- There was a nearly even division in the House over extension of slavery at this time. The anti-slavery forces experimented with finding the toughest law that could command a majority. Tallmadge first succeeded in passing an amendment that banned further importation of slaves into Missouri. He then managed, by a narrower margin, to pass the post-nati amendment (Figure 1). Encouraged by these successes, the anti-slavery forces tried to press even harder, to secure the same bans in the to-be-formed Arkansas territory, to the *south* of Missouri in the latitudes of Mississippi and Tennessee. This effort failed when Speaker Henry Clay of Kentucky, a slavery moderate, broke a tie vote.

No legislation passed the 15th Congress, however, as the Senate took a pro-slavery position. The impasse was solved by the famous Missouri Compromise that was formulated in the 16th Congress, seated following the 1818 elections.

There were two essential elements to the Compromise. Maine, a non-contiguous portion of Massachusetts, was carved out into a separate free state and admitted in March

1820. Missouri was then admitted as a slave state in August 1821, producing a balance of 12 free and 12 slave states.

Even more important than the Maine-Missouri tradeoff was the agreement that slavery would be prohibited in the remainder of the Louisiana Purchase north of 36°30´ latitude (the southern border of Missouri). The Missouri Compromise clearly unraveled the balance rule if the South were at all forward looking. In the 40-year period between the admission of Missouri and the outbreak of the Civil War, only 3 slave states south of the 36°30´ latitude were admitted to the Union. In contrast, 6 free states, including 3 in the area closed to slavery by the Missouri Compromise, were admitted by 1859.[12] Eventually, 8 more states entered the Union from the territory closed to slavery by the Missouri Compromise.[13]

Table 2 also shows the roll calls on the Missouri Compromise in the 16th House, and Figure 2 shows the crucial vote on 1 March 1820 that cemented the Compromise in place. The spatial structure is very clear. The voting was largely along the first dimension which during this period was essentially sectional – North versus South (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997, chapter 5).

Figure 2 about here

As we noted above, the spatial structure of Congressional voting during this period was very weak. The best-fitting (in terms of PRE, classification, and log-likelihood measures) issues were slavery/territorial. Next best were tariff issues, on which there was also a North-South split. But the tariff cutting lines were, rather than vertical, at a -45^{o} angle to the horizontal axis, as illustrated by the passage vote on the

1820 Tariff bill, shown in figure 3. This tariff vote can be compared to the critical vote on the Compromise, which has a vertical cutting line, shown in figure 2. The distinction arises because on the one hand, some coastal southern districts and districts in the Ohio River valley in Kentucky were on the high tariff side whereas districts in rural New England, in New Hampshire and Vermont, favored low tariffs. By having the -45^{o} angle, the tariff cutting line is able to put the Ohio River valley districts on the high tariff side and the rural New England districts on the low tariff side.

Figure 3 about here

The second dimension, because it is relatively weak, is more difficult to interpret than the first. It appears to distinguish supporters for a larger role for the federal government (up) from more traditional small-government Jeffersonians (down). For example, figure 4 shows a roll call on increasing military expenditure. The cutting line is nearly horizontal. Support for tariffs is also linked to support for a larger government, because the tariff was the main source of government revenue. Thus, the tariff vote shown in figure 3 was a blend of the two dimensions since tariff votes also responded to the same sectional divisions as occurred on slavery. Other, less important, issues did not fit the model as well.

Figure 4 about here

In any event, the critical votes on slavery in new states remained along the first dimension and were captured by the spatial model, as shown in table 2. The important votes fit very well. These were:

- A vote on 24 January 1820 where the north failed, by 2 votes, to block consideration of the statehood bill (PRE 0.87).
- A vote on 19 February 1820 that allowed Deep South representatives to oppose Maine statehood. This vote has a large "anti-slavery" majority because the North was solidly in favor and some representatives from the Middle South and Border States, mainly Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia voted for Maine, as required by the Compromise (PRE 0.77).
- Votes where the House "postured" in its negotiations with the Senate by rejecting amendments to its bill that were contained in the Senate bill. These votes were not knife-edge but were still reasonably close, with the anti-slavery side winning by margins of 20 to 30 votes (PREs of 0.88, 0.79, 0.91, 0.89, and 0.93).[14]
- The crucial vote on the Compromise, the first vote shown in bold in table 2 (PRE 0.89).

The Compromise was actually packaged as two votes. First, the House concurred in the Senate amendment allowing Maine and Missouri to enter, with Missouri as a slave state. This passed by a 3-vote margin, with the North in opposition. Thus northern representatives were allowed to go on record as opposing slavery. Next, the 36°30´ line was passed. (This is also shown in bold in table 2.) The PRE is low because the vote was not close. The most pro-slavery Southerners were allowed to take positions against. A few Northerners presumably not satisfied with the entire package, also voted against. But the important observation is that many Southerners voted in favor. In essence, the South traded away slavery in a huge piece of the nation in future years for slavery in Missouri. The Southern representatives had to be aware that the free part of the Louisiana

Purchase would eventually be formed into many states. The South was, almost literally, giving away the ranch to the North rather than obtaining a credible commitment on the future composition of the Senate.

Thus the Missouri Compromise did not maintain a credible commitment by the North that suddenly disappeared in 1850 with California's admission. On the contrary, the South appeared to have traded away the future in 1820 for the short-term gain of the admission of Missouri as a slave state.

Initially, the slow pattern of settlement in the North meant that the South could regard imbalance as relatively remote. But, after the balanced admissions of Arkansas, in 1836, and Michigan, in 1837 (and not in 1850!), the slave states became aware "that they had got the small end of the Missouri Compromise".[15] In a Christmas Day 1837 resolution, the Alabama legislature noted: "It needs but a glance at the map to satisfy the most superficial observer that an overbalance is produced by the extreme northeast, which as regards territory would be happily corrected and counterbalanced by the annexation of Texas."[16] In addition to Texas, Florida was admitted in 1845, producing an imbalance of 15 slave to 13 free states. The "compensating" free states, Iowa and Wisconsin, were admitted only in 1846 and 1848 respectively. In 1840, Iowa had 43,112 residents and Wisconsin 30,945, so there was no case for earlier admission. Yet the admission of these states, Minnesota, and, eventually, the plains states could be anticipated by the South.

In agreeing to the Missouri Compromise in 1820, the South indeed had no immediate concern. Southerners could have noticed that the Panic of 1819 and the collapse of the western economy would greatly slow down the expansion of the frontier.[17]

The Compromise succeeded perhaps not by the craft of Henry Clay and other politicians, but by the very slow rate of settlement of the West in this period.

After the Missouri flare-up, slavery was not an important part of the congressional agenda until *after* the formation of the Whig-Democratic political party system in the early 1830s. The collapse of the Federalist/Jeffersonian Republican Party system during the Era of Good Feelings was due not to slavery but to economic issues.

The controversy over Missouri fell in the middle of a period of democratization of American politics that can be roughly dated from about 1810 to 1828. The six states admitted before Missouri between 1810 and 1820 all entered the Union with constitutions that dropped property qualifications for voting and had popularly elected governors. Universal white male suffrage and direct elections in these states placed pressure on the older states to liberalize their qualifications for voting (Hofstadter, Miller, and Aaron, 1959, chapter 13). By 1841 only Rhode Island retained some property qualifications for voting. All the remaining states had universal white male suffrage. In addition, by 1828 every state except Delaware and South Carolina allowed popular election of presidential electors, and only New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina did not have popular election of governors. "The election of Jackson in 1828 was not the beginning, but rather the climax, of the strong impulse toward democracy that swept through the American states" (Hofstadter, Miller, and Aaron, 1959, vol. 1, p. 390).

By the end of Jackson's first term in 1832, a coherent two-party system had emerged in Congress. The primary dimension of conflict was economic, but a clear second dimension divided both political parties along sectional lines. Voting on slavery related issues during this period was not concerned with the admission of new states,

rather it was over mostly symbolic issues related to slavery, like the infamous “gag rule”. These tensions over slavery did not affect the regional bases of the two parties. As figures 5 and 6 demonstrate, the parties were extremely well balanced along North-South lines as measured by success in both presidential and House contests. In fact, through the 1830s there were proportionately more Whigs from slave states than non-slave states. Only in the 1840s did the Whigs become a regional party. Nevertheless, the Whigs continued to hold around 30% of the seats from slave states. The primary area of Whig weakness was in the newly admitted states of the West-- slave and non-slave. This is perhaps attributable to the general Whig hostility to expansion.

Figures 5 and 6 about here

Slavery could not be confined to largely symbolic issues for very long. In order to maintain long-term balance in the Senate given the territorial advantage conceded to the North, the South would need to undo the Missouri Compromise. There were only two possible lines of attack. One was to add new land south of 36°30´. The other was simply to overturn the Compromise and introduce slavery north of the line. In the meantime, however, the issue was postponed by the admission of states two at a time, in cross-regional pairs.

Arkansas and Michigan

The first states to enter after the Missouri Compromise were Arkansas and Michigan. Their admission appears linked to a balance rule. The Senate bills authorizing

state conventions were successive bills, S. 81 and S. 82. The debate on admission began with an "Anti-Jacksonian", Ewing of Ohio, trying to table both bills. The split on Arkansas-Michigan statehood was always partisan, with Jacksonians favorable and the incipient Whigs opposed. The Senate votes are shown in table 4. There is never a hint of regional voting. The votes have high fits to the spatial model with the exception of two procedural votes.

Tables 3 and 4 about here

One consequence of highly partisan voting is that the Jacksonians lost only two statehoods votes in the 24th Congress. One was an adjournment vote, on 3 January 1837. It is not clear if this loss had political relevance, signifying a possible unraveling of a Jacksonian logroll, or if the defectors simply wanted to adjourn for the day. On the next vote, on the next day, 9 Jacksonian senators changed sides. Although two switched to voting with the Whigs, seven switched back to their party majority. Passage of the bill followed on January 5.

Most of the Senate votes prior to passage concerned Michigan. The Anti-Jacksons, including Henry Clay, and the South Carolina Nullifiers led by John C. Calhoun, fought to delay a final vote. The issues were the state boundaries and land policy.

The boundary issue reappeared in the House votes, shown in table 3. The boundary question must have been favorable to Ohio. Of the 9 defecting Anti-Jacksons in the House on the motion of 14 April 1836 to take up the statehood bills, 7 were

representatives from Ohio. In contrast, on the vote to order the main question with regard to Arkansas, on 13 June, all 5 Anti-Jackson defectors are from slave states. The Ohio defections on boundary issue votes lower some of the PREs in table 3. Nevertheless, important votes on 3rd readings have high PREs. As in the Senate, the division was partisan, not regional.

We should emphasize that slavery was an important issue in the 24th Congress, with many votes on the slave trade in the District of Columbia, on sending slaves back to Africa, and on the petition rights of slaves. On these votes, there was a clear regional pattern. In contrast, "balance" on the admission issue meant that admissions were not used to debate slavery. This was apparent in the absence of a regional pattern, even on the two House votes concerning slavery in Arkansas.

Florida, Iowa, and Wisconsin

The admissions of Florida and Iowa were clearly linked in a common bill, H. R. 497, passed with relatively little debate and few roll calls in the 29th Congress. Procedural roll calls were along party lines in the Senate, but on other roll calls, both sides raised the slavery issue. In the House, Southern Democrats tried to add a provision that would have allowed Florida eventually to become two states. It was killed on an almost purely regional vote with a horizontal cutting line. Northern Democrats clearly felt the South had gone too far in this case. In the Senate, Northern Whigs sought to influence the slavery provision of the Florida constitution. On this issue, Northern Democrats stayed in the party coalition and supported slavery in Florida. Finally, the bill passed easily in the House. Nevertheless, all but one Northern Whig vote was cast

against passage. The Northern Whigs were thus on record as willing to hold up statehood in the North to prevent slavery in the South. This position may have further weakened their political viability on the frontier.

The entry of Wisconsin engendered very few roll calls in the House and none in the Senate. The votes generally divide one or both parties along regional lines. (See table 3.)

Texas

The strategy of adding land was first undertaken with respect to Texas. Texas annexation was a project not of the South, but of the Democratic Party. At the time of annexation, the Democrats had a hefty majority in the House but the Whigs controlled the Senate.

Tables 3 and 4 contain the roll call votes dealing with admission of Texas into the union. The admission of Texas was first taken up by the Senate in the context of ratifying a treaty (which required a 2/3 vote). Action on the treaty ran from May of 1844 to the end of the year. The Democrats, who were a minority, offered many amendments and motions to delay a final vote. The majority Whigs were almost always more disciplined than the Democrats, but party unity was not strong enough to get the necessary two-thirds vote. Northern Democrats were free to desert the party and do position taking by casting anti-Texas votes. Also in 1844, the House (table 3) conducted position-taking votes on the Texas issue. Every roll call in both houses fits the spatial model quite well. Roll call voting on Texas reflected both party discipline and North-South splits.

The proponents of Texas admission, most notably the lame-duck President John Tyler, then decided that Texas could be admitted by a resolution that required only a simple majority in both houses. During the lame-duck session of December 1844, the House began its deliberations on the terms of the U.S. annexation offer.[18] With a large Democratic majority, the House voted to admit Texas on 25 January 1845. Because the Democratic majority was substantial, both parties could allow defections.

Votes on Texas that had partisan defections from Southern Whigs and Northern Democrats have cutting lines angled about 45^{o} in the D-NOMINATE estimation. These votes express a mixture of party (vertical cutting lines) and regional (horizontal cutting lines) pressures. One such vote is the famous Brown amendment (Freehling, 1990, ch. 25), shown in figure 7. After their stinging defeat in the 1844 elections, Southern Whigs sought to shore up their pro-expansionist and pro-slavery credentials. On 13 January 1845, Milton Brown of Tennessee proposed allowing Texas to be split into as many as five states, with only the caveat that any state created north of 36°30´ must be a free state. The amendment respected the Missouri Compromise line, which showed that the line was still a binding commitment by the South a quarter-century after the Compromise.[19] Without the support of Brown and eight other Southern Whigs, the vote on the amendment and the bill might have been extremely close. But it is likely, given what happened later in the Senate, that the Southern Democrats could have pressured enough northern Democrats to support the bill so perhaps the Whig support in the House was perhaps less essential than it seems.

When the bill reached the Whig dominated Senate, the Democrats required perfect party discipline and a few Whig defections to get to a third reading. Such a vote,

illustrated by the third reading vote in figure 8, has a nearly vertical cutting line. (Note that the classification of the model would remain at one error if the cutting line were made vertical.) The map in the figure illustrates how party, not region, dictated the vote. State delegations that were split along party lines split in the vote. The vote was so close that every senator voted. The delegations from 7 of the 26 states split.

Figures 7 and 8 about here

The Senate was less inclined to go along with such a pro-slavery provision as the Brown amendment. Missouri's Thomas Hart Benton, the only Southern Democrat to vote against the annexation treaty in the previous session, was particularly determined to prevent Texas from becoming a major victory for "slave power" (Freehling, 1990, p.446). He proposed an alternative amendment requiring any division of Texas to correspond to the balance rule. Therefore two additional slave states and two additional free states could be carved out of Texas. Pressure from his own state legislature forced him to drop this proposal, however, and offer an amendment that was silent about future division but required a reopening of negotiations with Texas over boundary disputes. Ultimately, the Senate opted to leave it to the president's discretion whether to offer the Texans the Brown formula or the Benton formula. After the House voted to accept the Senate "no decision," Tyler and then Polk chose the Brown plan.[20]

The Texas Convention voted overwhelmingly in support of statehood. Admission occurred as soon as the 29th Congress convened, in December 1845. As Figures 9 and 10 show, the final passage vote was ideological, splitting the Whig party along regional

lines. The Senate vote in fact showed no classification errors. Note that the Democrats had more senators voting than the Whigs in the 29th Senate. Southern Whigs felt free to defect and go with the majority, pro-slavery position. Northern Whigs cast the only Senate votes opposed to the admission of Texas. The situation in the House is very similar. There were only 6 classification errors. These included the three northern Democrats who voted against Texas, the one northern Whig who voted in favor, and the one member of the American party who voted in favor. The maps in the House figure show that northern opposition had no strong regional base but was determined solely by whether a Whig or a Democrat had won the House seat in the elections of 1844.

Figures 9 and 10 about here

The Democratic logroll, however, continued the strategy of adding land by undertaking the Mexican War. President Polk had tried to buy New Mexico and California from Mexico for $40,000,000 in November 1845 (Presidents Jackson and Tyler had earlier tried to buy California) but the Mexican government rebuffed his offer. American expansionists including Polk wanted California badly because of the excellent ports at San Francisco and San Diego (Oregon had no harbors of comparable quality). This desire coupled with a continuing dispute with Mexico over the southern border of Texas, led to the outbreak of war in 1846.

With the victory of the American forces at Buena Vista and Vera Cruz, Polk sent an envoy, Nicholas Trist, to Mexico in 1847 with instructions to demand the Rio Grande River as the southern boundary of Texas and the cession of New Mexico and California.

During Trist's absence in the summer of 1847, considerable sentiment built up in the Polk administration for a prolonged occupation and perhaps the eventual annexation of all of Mexico. This led Polk to change his instructions to Trist who was in the middle of negotiations. Trist ignored Polk's new instructions and went on to negotiate a very favorable treaty that conformed to his original instructions. Polk promptly fired Trist when he returned to Washington but sent the treaty to Congress anyway. The treaty was passed by a vote of 38-14 by the Senate on 10 March 1848. Both Whigs and Democrats supported the treaty (11 –7 and 26 – 7, respectively); majorities of northerners and southerners also voted for the treaty. The fact that there was no sharp regional split on the treaty with Mexico and no strong appetite to annex all of Mexico was due to the southerners' misgivings about continued conflict with free-soilers about the disposition of such large territories and the fear that an armed occupation would surely increase the power of the federal government in the long run (Hofstadter, Miller, and Aaron, 1959, ch. 15).

A large chunk of the territory acquired from Mexico was below the 36°30´ Missouri Compromise line so that, in theory, slavery might have been extended to these territories. President Taylor proposed extending the 36°30´ line westward which, assuming a split of California, could have eventually given rise to 3 slave and 3 free states. But even this proposal would not have allowed the South to maintain balance, given that most of the United States was north of 36°30´.

California and the Compromise of 1850

The South's long-run problems were further worsened by northern settlement of the Oregon country in the Pacific Northwest. The South could do little with respect to this free land (eventually 3 more states) other than to block any urge to fight a war with the British over the northern boundary. Again the pattern of settlement was important to the status quo.

Moreover, non-slaveholders settled California after the discovery of gold in 1848. The North was now adamant about blocking any extension of slavery. The Compromise (or Armistice, as it is called by Freehling, 1990) of 1850 admitted California as a free state. The North also succeeded in abolishing the slave trade in the District of Columbia and having substantial Texas land claims ceded to the federal government. The South got a fugitive slave law, federal assumption of the Texas debt, and a non-decision on slavery in the Utah and New Mexico territories created on former Mexican land.

The ideological map of voting on the Compromise of 1850 resembled figure 7 but with an important difference. Many northern Whigs abstained rather than vote against the Compromise, thus allowing the principal elements to pass. But, the strain of the Compromise on the party system was too great. The political parties fragmented along regional lines and the Whig party simply imploded. The result was that roll call voting in the 32nd Congress was completely disorganized – indeed, it was essentially spatially chaotic (Silbey, 1967; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997).

The Compromise of 1850 was unacceptable to all sides. It left slavery present in much of the nation. On the other hand, Southern beliefs that the annexation of Texas and the war with Mexico would correct the imbalance implicit in the Missouri Compromise were not fulfilled. In 1850, the Union contained 31 states. Of the remaining 17 states

that would fill out the "lower 48," only two, Arizona and New Mexico, could conceivably have been slave if 36°30´ were maintained.

The Compromise of 1850 also represented the rejection of any plans to maintain balance via the subdivision of Texas into multiple slave states as allowed by its annexation treaty. Plans for such a subdivision were hatched by Daniel Webster in February of 1849. Concerned that the preservation of the union required a pro-southern compromise championed by a northerner, he proposed dividing Texas into three states while admitting only the portions of California above 36^{o} 30. When other Whig leaders convinced him that the plan made too many concession to the South, he backed off his proposal only to have it carried forward by the future presidential nominee, John Bell from Tennessee. The plan was a non-starter, however, not only because of intense opposition from the North, but also because the opposition of Texas whose acquiescence was required to carry out the plan. To the Texans, there were a number of issues that trumped increasing the representation of slave states. Many were concerned about the economic and trade implications of subdividing the state. However, more importantly, it was considered doubtful that states carved out of southwestern Texas would remain slave states.[21] This area had few slaves and many Texans feared the consequences of having a free-soil state on their border. This area was also the home of a movement that sought to be separated from Texas. In particular, many of the region's residents of Mexican descent felt that the state would abrogate any pre-independence land claims. As a result, many Texans felt that any effort to subdivide Texas was a placation of the separatists (Stegmaier 1996).

Minnesota

Votes on Minnesota were the first statehood votes after the balance rule had been broken. The South does not appear to have fought further admissions vigorously. Indeed, the votes on passing S. 86 were "Hurrah" votes (see tables 5 and 6). If there was a commitment in American politics, it was not to balance admissions but to admit new states once they had reached a sufficient population. Minnesota was hardly held back. Its population at admission was less than that of Wisconsin and Michigan when they were admitted. The debate on Minnesota concerned voting rights for aliens, a salient issue for the American Party, and the number of representatives to be seated before the 1860 census. These votes were not along party lines. The issues related partly to nativism, which does not fit well in the two-dimensional space. The South did vote almost as a bloc on several amendments dealing with the number of representatives, but there were always some defections. On the whole, the South sought only to make a temporary limit to the effect of Minnesota's admission (because the census would shortly determine the number of representatives). Further changes in the slave state/free state ratio were not resisted.

Tables 5 and 6 about here

Oregon

Oregon was the last state to be admitted before the Civil War and the Oregon Territory is an interesting case study of how the Missouri Compromise undid the South. The American claim to the Oregon Territory came through the Louisiana Purchase of

1803 but England, Spain, and Russia also made claims to the area. In the 1844 presidential election the Oregon boundary question ("54^{o} 40' or fight!") was almost as important as the issue of Texas annexation (Hofstadter, Miller, and Aaron, 1959, vol 1, ch. 15). This dispute was the result of a large influx of Americans into Oregon via wagon trains beginning in 1843. This continuing influx made British control impossible over the long run.

In an 1818 treaty the United States and Britain had set the northern border at 49^{o}. In 1827 the treaty was extended another 10 years with a one-year "opt-out" clause. On the eve of the Mexican War, in 1846, Congress reduced tariffs on British manufactures, and there was change of government in Britain. This pair of events considerably reduced the tension between the two countries. The British proposed a compromise to President Polk – extend the 49^{o} northern boundary to the Pacific Ocean and in exchange the British would keep all of Vancouver Island and would retain navigation rights on the Columbia River. President Polk and Congress were on the verge of war with Mexico (declared on 13 May 1846) and the British offer seemed like a good deal given that most of the quality farmland was south of the 49th parallel. Consequently, the deal was struck on 15 June 1846.

The moral of the Oregon story is that the slavery issue played no important part in the politics of annexation. Rather, it was a mix of pure American nationalism and the desire to avoid a two-front war. However, it was inevitable that the states carved out of the Oregon territory (Oregon, Washington, and Idaho) would be free states.

Given this history, it is not surprising that the admission of Oregon as a free state appears to have been largely uncontested. The Democratic majorities in the Senate

managed the bills. The manager in the Senate appears to have been Douglas of Illinois, sponsor of the Kansas-Nebraska Act that undid the Missouri Compromise. The manager in the House was the future Confederate vice-president, Stephens of Georgia. Voting was not along party lines in the Senate, where, with the exception of one procedural vote, PREs were low. Perhaps Republicans were dissatisfied with the terms of the bill. Moreover, Oregon's admission appears to have been premature, as it had a lower population than any state previously admitted, with the exception of Illinois admitted 40 years earlier, in 1818. PREs were higher in the House. The Democrats voted against an alternative Republican bill and the Republicans voted against passage of the Democratic bill.

Kansas and Nebraska

The South's only possible salvation lay in undoing 36°30´. Congress did so with the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854. Senator Stephen Douglas, an Illinois Democrat, bought southern votes for a northern, rather than southern, route for the transcontinental railway with a measure that would have allowed the Nebraska territory, which was north of the Missouri Compromise line, to enter as two states. One, Kansas, would be slave, even though slavery was almost certainly economically not viable in Kansas. The other, Nebraska, would be free.

The bill passed, pushed by the long-standing Democratic Party alliance in which the current Middle West traded votes on slavery for votes on economic matters

(Weingast, 1991). But it was the last hurrah. Northern politicians, unwilling to trade away the slavery issue, displaced the old political class of the Second Party system.

The structure of Congressional voting completely changed. The primary dimension of conflict was now over the extension of slavery to the territories. The second dimension of the Democrat-Whig party system was now the first dimension of the new system that emerged with the voting in 1853-54 (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). The losing coalition that fought the Kansas-Nebraska act eventually became the Republican Party.

With the emergence of the Republican Party any hope of maintaining balance vanished. This was true even for lands south of 36°30´. Cuba had been the focus of American expansionists for a long time. Cuba was a potentially large and highly profitable slave territory. President Polk offered Spain $100,000,000 for Cuba in 1848 but Spain turned it down. In 1854 during the Pierce administration, another abortive attempt was made to acquire Cuba that touched off the "Ostend Manifesto" incident. By this time, however, the combination of free-soil sentiment and the passions raised by the Kansas-Nebraska Act doomed the effort to annex Cuba (Hofstadter, Miller, and Aaron, 1959, vol. 1, ch. 18). There would be no future senators from the slave state(s) of Cuba to balance those from the territories north of 36°30´.

Like Weingast (1991), we conclude that balance in the Senate was a major issue in the admission of new states before the Civil War. Our view, however, is that politicians in Washington did not and could not vote in Congress to make credible commitments on slavery via balance in the Senate. They did not because the Missouri Compromise promised imbalance in the long run. They could not, because ordinary

citizens were voting with their feet, moving to new lands that then demanded representation in the Union. Jefferson's Land Ordinances helped undo slavery. Indeed, although historians have focussed on the political conflict over the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854, neither Kansas nor Nebraska was admitted before the Civil War. In contrast, Minnesota and Oregon were rather quietly admitted as free states, under a Democratic president and Congress, strengthening the imbalance in the Senate initiated by California's admission in 1850.

4. The Period of Republican Dominance: 1861 - 1912

Almost as soon as shots were fired at Fort Sumter, the Republican Party began the process of making its tenuous hold on the American government more permanent. This was not a cynical goal. After all, "winning" the war involved not only preservation of the Union but also the faithful implementation of Republican policies in its aftermath. It is often easy to forget how fragile Republican control was at the outbreak of hostilities. Lincoln had been elected with a mere 40% of the popular vote against a badly split Democratic opposition. Even after the secession of eleven states who had cast very few Republican votes in 1860, Lincoln gathered only 55% of the 1864 vote in spite of a dramatic pro-Union turn in the tide of the war.[22] As a concession to its uncertain electoral situation, the party went so far as to give the second position on its national ticket to Andrew Johnson, a slaveholding Democrat from a border state.

Just as before the war, political necessity played a large part in the incorporation of territories as states. The Republicans in Congress moved quickly to grant statehood to

Kansas, Nevada, and the unionist counties of western Virginia. Congress also voted in 1864 to offer statehood to Colorado, but its voters rejected the state constitution and so Colorado remained outside the Union for another twelve years.

In the cases of West Virginia and Nevada, the Republicans broke decisively with constitutional doctrine and prior practice. Maintaining the illegality of Virginia's ordinance of secession, the congressional Republicans fudged the constitutional restriction against altering a state's borders without its consent. Whereas the creation of West Virginia was a one-time constitutional deviation, the entrance of Nevada fundamentally changed the rules of statehood politics. Nevada was admitted even though it failed to meet any of the admission criteria that had been applied before the war-- most notably a population large enough to entitle it to a single House seat. As Stewart and Weingast (1992) point out, Nevada would have satisfied the population criterion only in 1970. The Republicans' political ingenuity was quickly repaid in electoral votes.

At war's end, the Republican Party's future was made more precarious by the impending return of the Confederate states. Given that its success had probably peaked in its core states of the Northeast and Middle West, its survival as the majority party hinged on expanding its sphere. There were two directions it could go: south or west.

A major goal of radical Reconstruction was an attempt to build a Republican Party in the South.[23] The main components of this strategy were black enfranchisement and the reinstitution of Southern Whiggery. The powers of the federal government were forcefully turned in both of these directions. The military was to enforce black voting rights, and equally important, deny them to former Confederates. Federal patronage was

used to draw northern Republicans to the South and encourage southern whites to identify with the party.

Unfortunately for the Republicans, these tactics were not very complementary, and which one to emphasize was a matter of great consternation within the party. The need to reserve patronage to attract whites denied positions to blacks that would have enhanced their political incorporation. Furthermore, patronage failed to attract many highly qualified whites to the South because private sector opportunities there were slim for men who migrated to serve in a Republican administration. Aggressive use of the military to support black voting only alienated whites further. Republicans with an ideological commitment to civil rights clashed repeatedly with those of a more Whiggish orientation over Reconstruction policy. To exacerbate matters, President Johnson, a former Democrat who coveted the 1868 Democratic nomination, fought radical Reconstruction policy in general and Republican party building in general. These clashes, along with the fact that Republican trade and monetary policies hampered southern economic recovery, quickly reduced the Southern Republican Party to the party of scalawags, carpetbaggers, and freedmen.

With the increasing probability that the original "southern strategy" would fail, the Republicans turned west (Stewart and Weingast, 1992). This strategy had its own problems. Not the least was that few areas had a substantial population. None of the Republican areas of the west had a population that would support statehood based on pre-war standards. Only Mormon (and presumably Democratic) Utah would have qualified. Although the entrance of Nevada showed that the statehood criteria were "suggestions" at best, admitting underpopulated states posed a number of problems for Republicans. The

population of the new states remained a potent (though rarely decisive) issue for the Democratic opponents of expansion. Furthermore, the small population bases would be little help in electing substantial numbers of Republicans to the House and be only marginal help in the Electoral College. The one salvation was that the malapportionment of the Senate would allow for Republican dominance of that body with the help of newly admitted western states. The Republicans' best hope was to preserve the status quo via control of the Senate.

There were many other impediments to the new state strategy as well. Once again Andrew Johnson played the antagonist. His conflicts with the radical Republicans over Reconstruction policy forced him to oppose western statehood on political grounds. To this end, he vetoed bills calling for Nebraska and Colorado statehood. To complicate matters further, the Republican economic policies were as unpopular with western agricultural interests as they were in the South. The Republicans' hope was that Union veterans living on homesteads and receiving generous pensions would be reluctant to vote for the party of "rum, romanism, and rebellion" regardless of the GOP's other policies.

To better relate statehood to the politics of the era, Tables 5 - 8 contain all of the major votes on expansion for both houses until 1911. Before we turn to analyses of each statehood controversy, a few comments about general patterns are in order. First, the extent of partisan division grew tremendously. Judging either by the PREs of the unidimensional model or by the partisan voting margin, the issue was far more partisan in the 1880s and 1890s than in the 1860s. In the 1860s, the Democrats were often monolithic, but the Republicans were substantially divided, especially on Colorado. Perhaps because the failure of southern Republicanism was not yet imminent, other issues

also influenced voting decisions before 1876. As the party system became more competitive, however, short-term political considerations came to be dominant. Second, the parties were often inconsistent about which territories they supported for statehood. Republicans went from being the biggest supporters of New Mexico statehood to being diehard opponents just as Democrats picked up its cause.

A final puzzle relates to the Democrats' failure to emulate the Republican strategies. The Democrats failed to move on the entry of Democratic states on the occasions when they had an opportunity. In the 46th Congress, they held both chambers of Congress but did not record a vote on the admission of the Democratic territories. While the inaction may be attributable to a Republican in the White House, it does not explain similar inactivity of the Democratic Senate during unified Democratic control of both branches in the 53rd Congress.[24] One reason for Democratic timidity may have been the uncertainty of political attachments in such underdeveloped polities. Weingast and Stewart (1992) show that partisanship of territorial delegates helped predict party positions on statehood controversies, but this predictability does not necessarily extend very far into the future. Figure 11 shows the percentage of seat-years of new states that each party controlled in the Senate. Although Democrats were relatively rewarded for their efforts on Montana statehood, they were burned by Utah and New Mexico. Republicans were also guilty of major miscalculations on Colorado, Arizona, West Virginia, and Oklahoma.

Figure 11 about here

To understand these voting patterns better, we now turn to a closer examination of each of the statehood controversies of the era.

The War Years

The debate on the admission of Kansas as a free state began in advance of the secession crisis and wrapped up slightly more than a month after South Carolina passed its articles of secession. In its first session, the 36th House passed H.R. 23. The vote fit nicely into the pattern of statehood voting established in prior episodes. The pattern of the voting on the roll call was primarily regional. Whereas Republicans were unified in support of Kansas as a free state, the Democratic Party was deeply split along regional lines. All 40 Southern Democrats voted against the bill; Northern Democrats went 21-8 in favor.

Because of Democratic opposition, the Senate did not take up Kansas statehood until January 1861, during the lame-duck session of Congress. A motion in June 1860 by Benjamin Wade to bring the Kansas bill to the floor was defeated on a party-line vote with only two Democratic defections (#261). By the time the bill reached the Senate floor, the secession crisis led many Northern Democrats to break with their southern colleagues and vote overwhelmingly in favor of statehood. Interestingly, Andrew Johnson was the lone southerner voting for Kansas. By the time that the House voted to concur with the Senate's technical amendments, support was so overwhelming that it was brought to the floor by a 2/3 vote to suspend the rules and then passed on a voice vote.

The absence of southern representation in Congress gave the Republicans an opportunity to expand the Union. The first opportunity was to create a new state in the mountainous pro-Union areas of Virginia. This was accomplished despite some splits in the Republican Party over the details. One split vote took place in the Senate on 17 July 1862 on the West Virginia statehood bill S. 365 (#529). Seven Republican senators sided with the Democratic opposition. The opposition came in part from prominent abolitionists such as Preston King and Charles Sumner. Although other abolitionists were strong supporters, notably the bill's sponsor, Ben Wade, it was clearly troubling to abolitionists to admit a new state that allowed slavery. The Senate on the same day voted down an amendment to ban slavery in the state (not shown). Four of the seven senators who voted against the bill voted for the amendment. Perhaps the anti-slavery commitment symbolized by the Emancipation Proclamation issued in September 1862 quelled abolitionist concerns, as Republicans were far more unified on the final passage votes between December 1862 and February 1863.

With the link of slavery to expansion severed, the Republicans turned west to Nebraska, Nevada, and Colorado. As Weingast and Stewart point out, these territories failed to meet the pre-war criteria for statehood on almost every dimension. Not only were their populations a fraction of that required for a House seat in the established states, the territories themselves were new creations. The Republicans pushed enabling acts for these territories at the end of the 37th Congress. Nevada passed easily, and Colorado passed by a single vote. However, Nebraska statehood was tabled with Republican votes. The Nevada and Colorado bills reached the House in the shadow of adjournment, forcing

supporters to move to suspend the rules to bring the Nevada and Colorado bills to the floor. The motion fell well short of the required 2/3 vote.

The setback was temporary for Nevada, as its enabling act was passed on voice votes early in the 38th Congress. Colorado's act passed on a voice vote in the Senate and a lopsided roll call in the House. To the chagrin of its supporters, Colorado voters rejected the constitution crafted at the territorial convention and so remained outside the Union.[25] A Nebraska bill passed the House with Republican support, but no action was taken in the Senate.

Reconstruction

After Lincoln's death, statehood politics became intimately entwined with the controversies over Reconstruction. President Johnson was disinclined to help his radical opponents increase their representation in the Senate. He also felt that it was inappropriate to admit new states until the southern states were returned to their former status. Therefore, when Johnson was presented with bills for Colorado and Nebraska statehood in May 1866, he vetoed them. Colorado statehood had insufficient support for an override, and Nebraska was the victim of a pocket veto. Johnson's stated justification for the vetoes was that the proposed constitutions guaranteed suffrage only to whites, although he was otherwise no champion of the rights of blacks (Sefton, 1980). In the case of Nebraska, this strategy backfired, as a new statehood bill was passed that guaranteed black suffrage. It shored up support among Republican radicals such as Charles Sumner and Benjamin Wade. The more unified Republicans easily overrode a second veto. The same tactic failed to gain Colorado statehood. The veto override fell

just 3 votes short. From the D-NOMINATE estimation, it appears that the defection of New York's Senate delegation and a couple of New England senators was pivotal. The tumultuous nature of Colorado politics undoubtedly contributed. It was likely that the same conflicts that had sunk statehood three years earlier could be rekindled.[26]

Colorado's statehood struggle continued until the final days of Reconstruction. In the lame-duck session after the loss of the House in the 1874 elections, Republicans sought to admit Colorado and New Mexico. The bills passed the Senate easily (Colorado 47-17, New Mexico 31-11). Although they were unified on Colorado, the Republicans were somewhat split over New Mexico. As there was unified Democratic opposition, it seems unlikely that New Mexico was considered less reliably Republican. Opposition to a state with a Hispanic majority was more likely a cause. New Mexico's Hispanic population was strongly Union during the war and sympathetic to radical Reconstruction, but the fact that only two New Mexico counties could feasibly hold jury trials in English gave nativists a potent issue (Larson, 1968). Debates over whether the state constitution should make English the official language and require English instruction in public schools dominated the deliberations. The critical votes in the House came as the lame-duck session wound down. Because of time constraints, supporters of both bills sought to avoid a referral to the Committee on Territories. Therefore they sought to bring the bills to the floor under a suspension of the rules, which required a 2/3 majority (Larson, 1968). The first motion, which sought to bring both bills to the floor, failed by 1 vote (164-83). The motions were then split. Colorado's motion passed (166-78) and New Mexico's failed (155-86). Six Republicans voted yea on Colorado and no on New Mexico while

four Democrats did the same. Colorado entered the Union just in time to cast its three electoral votes for Hayes in the 1876 elections.[27]

The Era of Partisan Balance

The elections of 1876 ushered in an era of partisan balance and recurring divided government. The stakes involved in statehood politics had increased, but neither party had sufficient control of the federal government to push the admission of its preferred states. No serious attempt at expansion was mounted until the later 1880s. Bills on behalf of the Dakotas often passed one house only to die in the other. In the elections of 1888, however, both political parties had strong expansionist planks. The Democrats called for statehood for Montana, Dakota, Washington, and New Mexico, and the Republicans added Wyoming, Idaho, and Arizona (Spence, 1975). When the Republicans swept both branches of government, the Democrats were eager to act in order to deny the Republicans all the credit. In the following lame-duck session, the Democratic House and president and the Republican Senate were able to reach agreement on the admission of North and South Dakota, Washington, and Montana. The Democrats saw the admission of the Republican Dakotas and Washington as a *fait accompli*. Rather than obstruct, they were able to secure admission of Democratic Montana. The Democrats also sought the admission of New Mexico, but that proposal was eliminated in conference because of Republican opposition.[28] In 1890, the now dominant Republicans pushed Wyoming and Idaho on strict party line voting. The Democrats only feasible defense was to attempt to insert delays into the ratification process of the state constitutions, but these amendments were voted down each time. By the time Idaho came

up for final passage in the House, all but two Democrats had left the floor in an attempt to withhold quorum.

In spite of years of Democratic support for Utah statehood, two factors delayed its admission. The first was Mormon opposition to federal laws against plural marriage, and the second was the fact that the Mormons tended to support their own local political party rather than the national parties (Lyman, 1986). The way for statehood was finally paved by the Woodruff Manifesto, which declared that polygamy violated Mormon doctrine, and by the disbanding of the Mormon political party.[29] When these events combined with the Democratic victories in 1892, Utah was granted statehood. The enabling bill passed the House with Republican opposition on procedural roll calls. Final passage occurred on a voice vote on 12 December 1893. By the time the bill reached the Senate, the Republicans were fully on board lest they completely alienate the citizens of the future state of Utah. At the same time, Democratic leaders became hesitant after a dramatic shift to the Republicans in the previous territorial assembly elections. Because they could no longer blame the Republicans' intransigence on Utah, however, they eventually allowed the bill to come to the floor. It passed on a voice vote. The Democrats were rewarded with three electoral votes for Bryan while the Republicans got two more Senators.

The Southwest

After the admission of Idaho and Wyoming, the only remaining territories in the contiguous United States were New Mexico, Arizona, and Oklahoma. Once again partisanship played a big role in forming preferences over statehood. The Republicans

were keen to admit Oklahoma, whereas Arizona and New Mexico were considered Democratic projects.

After the Democrats regained the House after the 1890-midterm elections, the House passed New Mexico and Arizona bills, but the Republican Senate was not interested.[30] When similar bills passed the House in 1893, surprisingly they died in a Democratic Senate.[31]

The next major push for statehood was made jointly by the three remaining territories in the 58th Congress. The proposal called for Oklahoma and the Indian Territory to be admitted as one state and for New Mexico and Arizona to be admitted as the state of Montezuma. Presumably, the proposal was designed to generate enough partisan balance to get through a unified Republican government. While Republican attempts to sever the proposal into separate bills for each state failed, the desired effect was achieved through the bitter political rivalries between Arizona and New Mexico. After the bill was passed, Oklahoma moved quickly toward statehood; Arizona and New Mexico voters had to vote on the controversial jointure proposal. An overwhelmingly anti-jointure vote in Arizona led to the referendum's defeat.

Finally in 1911, a Democratic House with the help of many Republicans, especially in the Senate, passed an act calling for separate statehood for Arizona and New Mexico. But, the completion of the continental 48 was not achieved without some controversy. The proposed Arizona state constitution was a manifesto for the progressive movement that contained many of the movement's favorite political institutions and reforms. Most controversial was the provision for voter recall of state judges. This proposal not only enraged conservatives like President Taft, but some leading

progressives as well. Ironically, New Mexico's constitution was attacked as being too conservative because its amendment procedures were too demanding. Taft vetoed the first resolution accepting the state constitutions. When a resolution passed to accept the Arizona constitution if voters struck the offending provision, Taft signed it. Arizona and New Mexico soon joined the Union.

The Policy Effects of Expansion

In this section, we ask how successful the Republican strategy of expansion was in promoting its policy goals. First we look at the relation of the new entrants to old state Republicans on the first dimension D-NOMINATE scores. Then we examine two issues that were important to the Republicans and distinguished them from the Democrats: tariffs and currency (see Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Did members of Congress from the new states support the Republicans on these issues? We examine voting patterns on these issues from 1861-1920 to see if the new states were sources of support for Republican policies.

Figure 12 shows the mean D-NOMINATE score in the Senate for each party juxtaposed against that of the Republicans from the new states (listed in figure 11). Clearly, senators from the new states occupied the central part of the political spectrum. This pattern is due to two factors: some of the new senators were affiliated with the Democrats; and Republican senators from the western states were systematically more moderate than Republicans elsewhere. The net effect of expanding statehood on the

political center of the Senate is negligible except for two periods of slight Republican advantage around 1890 and 1910.

Figure 12 about here

We now turn to the effects on the salient issues of trade and currency. Figures 13 and 14 show the support scores for the Republican majority (old states) position on tariff and currency votes. Because these issues define the post-war party alignment, we find that Republican support on these issues is very high and Democratic support very low. However, new state Republican support is quite mixed. Tariff support does not differ significantly between the new and old states. In fact, westerners were occasionally a bit more supportive of the Republican position. Thus statehood politics probably did help the Republican bid to maintain high tariffs. Currency is quite a different story. After 1880, western Republican support for hard money was always well below that of the eastern Republicans and occasionally below that of Democrats. When the Democratic and Populist senators are added to the mix, the Republican admissions policy moved monetary policy decidedly toward that of the Democrats.

Figures 13 and 14 about here

It is unclear to what extent Republicans were aware of or anticipated these policy trade-offs, but the net policy effect of western expansion seems to have been higher tariffs

and softer money. One should not, however, exaggerate the effects of the new states on the Republican party. The difference between new state Republicans and the overall party, shown in figure 12, is generally small, particularly in 1912 when the party split before the presidential election. The reason is that agrarian or progressive Republicans were not confined to the new states. For example, the 10 most liberal Republican D-NOMINATE scores in the 60th Senate (1911-13) were divided evenly between Republicans from ante-bellum admits (Lafollete, WI; Clapp, MN; Works, CA; Kenyon, IA; and Cummins, IA) and those from new states (Poindexter, WA; Bristow, KS; Borah; ID; Gronna, ND; and Crawford, SD). The intersectional rivalry was not between the thinly populated new states and older ones but between the farm belt and the industrial states.

6. Conclusion

Territorial expansion and the incorporation of new states is one of the most important institutional changes that the United States has endured since its inception. The politics of statehood has had substantial effects on the historical development of American political institutions and policies. The debates over these institutional changes, however, were not couched in broad, principled terms, but rather in terms of short-run political expediency. The inability of statehood politics (or any other institutional change) to commit the nation to any particular policy course meant that short-term considerations always dominated. Thus statehood was always tied to the political concerns and party systems of the day. Just as the "Balance Rule" was a set of short-term

kluges rather than a long-term commitment, post-bellum Republican dominance through expansion proved elusive.

The politics of statehood provides many lessons for the study of the processes of institutional change. The analogies to other federations undergoing potential expansion, such as the European Union, are clear. We also learn much about institutional change in general. It is rarely carried out through a "veil of ignorance." It is difficult to use institutional mechanisms to generate long term commitments. Given these conditions, the battle over short-term advantage is rarely likely to produce the "efficient" set of institutions.

Table 1a.
The Inclusion of New States

State	Admitted	Slavery Status	Total Free States	Total Slave States	Population at Entry	US Population at Previous Census
Original 13	1787-1790	**See Notes**	7	6	3-4,000,000	
Vermont	1791	Free	8	6	92,329	3,929,214
Kentucky	1792	Slave	8	7	103,133	3,929,214
Tennessee	1796	Slave	8	8	77,638	3,929,214
Ohio	1803	Free	9	8	100,984	5,308,483
Louisiana	1812	Slave	9	9	91,926	7,239,881
Indiana	1816	Free	10	9	98,115	7,239,881
Mississippi	1817	Slave	10	10	62,205	7,239,881
Illinois	1818	Free	11	10	46,625	7,239,881
Alabama	1819	Slave	11	11	116,016	7,239,881
Maine	1820	Free	12	11	298,335	9,638,459
Missouri	1821	Slave	12	12	73,973	9,638,459
Arkansas	1836	Slave	12	13	70,700	12,886,020
Michigan	1837	Free	13	13	158,079	12,886,020
Florida	1845	Slave	13	14	70,961	17,069,453
Texas	1845	Slave	13	15	212,592	17,069,453
Iowa	1846	Free	14	15	132,573	17,069,453
Wisconsin	1848	Free	15	15	360,577	17,069,453
California	1850	Free	16	15	92,597	23,191,876
Minnesota	1858	Free	17	15	138,834	23,191,876
Oregon	1859	Free	18	15	48,428	23,191,876
Kansas	1861	Free	19	15	132,925	31,443,321
West Virginia	1863	Free	20	15	296,286	31,443,321
Nevada	1864	Free	36	0	21,111	31,443,321
Nebraska	1867	Free	37	0	94,747	31,443,321
Colorado	1876	Free	38	0	132,542	39,818,449
North Dakota	1889	Free	39	0	175,576	50,155,783
South Dakota	1889	Free	40	0	323,567	50,155,783
Montana	1889	Free	41	0	132,548	50,155,783
Washington	1889	Free	42	0	329,020	50,155,783
Idaho	1890	Free	43	0	88,548	62,947,714
Wyoming	1890	Free	44	0	62,555	62,947,714
Utah	1896	Free	45	0	250,361	62,947,714
Oklahoma	1907	Free	46	0	1,396,900	75,994,575
Arizona	1912	Free	47	0	230,000	91,972,266
New Mexico	1912	Free	48	0	333,600	91,972,266
Alaska	1960	Free	49	0	226,000	178,464,236
Hawaii	1960	Free	50	0	633,000	178,464,236

Notes: In 1776, slavery had been abolished in only 2 of the original 13 states. By 1849, it had been abolished in all of the 7 "free" states among the original 13. However, abolition was often restricted only to those born after a certain date. In 1860, 18 slaves remained in New Jersey, a "free" state. (Freehling, 1990, pp. 133, 480). Slavery also existed in the form of "black apprentices" in the "free" states. Apprentices continued in Illinois until 1824 (Freehling, 1990, p. 149). President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 freed slaves only in Confederate states but, for simplicity, all states are treated as "Free" beginning in 1864. Slavery was ended in all of the United States by the 13th amendment, ratified 18 December 1865. Source for population figures, Stewart and Weingast, 1992, p. 256, Morison and Commager,. 1950, p. 790.

Table 1b.
Size of Congressional Delegations of States Admitted in Decade Prior to Reapportionment Year

Year	New State Representatives	New State Senators	New States
1793	4	4	VT, KY
1803	2	2	TN
1813	2	4	OH, LA
1823	16	12	IN, MS, IL, AL, ME, MO
1833	0	0	
1843	3	4	AR, MI
1853	10	10	FL, TX, IO, WI, CA
1863	4	6	MN, OR, KS
1873	5	6	WV, NV, NE
1883	1	2	CO
1893	6	12	ND, SD, MT, WA, ID, WY
1903	1	2	UT
1913	6	6	OK, AZ, NM
1923-53	0	0	
1963	3	4	AK, HI

Table 2
Statehood and Slavery Roll Calls in House of Representatives 1817-1821

Congress	States	Date	Margin	Republican	Federalist	Class. Errors	PRE	Vote Description
15	n/a	1/30/1818	69-84	53-69	16-15	25	.64	Pass Fugitive Slave Bill
15	Missouri	2/16/1819	87-76	65-64	22-12	5	.93	Tallmadge Amend, No New Slaves in MO
15	Missouri	2/16/1819	82-78	63-66	19-12	10	.87	Free MO Slaves at Age 25
15	Arkansas	2/18/1819	70-71	54-61	16-10	7	.90	No Slavery in Arkansas
15	Arkansas	2/18/1819	75-73	58-63	17-10	7	.90	Free Arkansas Slaves at Age 35
15	Arkansas	3/2/1819	86-90	64-76	22-14	10	.88	No New Slaves in Arkansas
15	Missouri	3/2/1819	78-76	56-65	22-11	4	.95	Strike Free MO Slaves at Age 25
16	Missouri	1/24/1820	86-88	73-78	13-10	11	.87	Postpone MO Bill
16	Maine	2/19/1820	107-70	90-61	17-9	16	.77	Commit Maine Admission
16	Missouri	2/23/1820	93-72	77-64	16-8	9	.88	Disagree with Sen. Amendments
16	Missouri	2/23/1820	102-68	86-60	16-8	14	.79	Disagree with Sen. Amendments
16	Missouri	2/28/1820	97-76	82-68	15-8	7	.91	Insist on Disagreement
16	Missouri	2/29/1820	98-82	84-71	14-11	9	.89	Abolish Future Slavery in MO/Fugitive Slaves
16	Missouri	2/29/1820	94-86	80-75	14-11	6	.93	Abolish Future Slavery in MO
16	**Missouri**	**3/1/1820**	**87-90**	**73-78**	**14-12**	**10**	**.89**	**Concur to Sen. Amendment**
16	**Missouri**	**3/2/1820**	**134-42**	**115-36**	**19-6**	**28**	**.33**	**No Slavery North of 36°30'**
16	Missouri	2/12/1821	61-107	46-97	15-10	16	.74	Ban Slavery in MO

Notes: The first entry in the margins shows the votes for the anti-slavery position. The breakdown is shown first for the entire House (Margin) and then for the Republican and Federalist parties. "Class. Errors" shows total classification errors of the D-NOMINATE model for the roll call. PRE shows the proportionate-reduction in error with respect to the margins. For example, in the last row PRE= 1-5/66=0.92.

Table 3
Statehood Roll Calls in House of Representatives 1835-1845

Congress	States	Date	Margin	Anti-Jackson Or Whig	Jackson Or Democrat	Class. Errors	PRE	Vote Description
24	Michigan	12/30/1835	133-47	31-25	88-16	41	.13	Admit Elected MI Member as Spectator
24	Michigan	1/5/1836	110-101	11-58	95-29	45	.55	MI Memorial
24	MI, AR	4/14/1836	119-70	9-51	108-5	17	.76	Introduce Res. On AR and MI bills
24	Michigan	6/13/1836	153-45	29-35	115-2	24	.47	3rd Reading of S. 177
24	Arkansas	6/13/1836	126-67	15-45	108-9	15	.78	3rd Reading of S. 178
24	Arkansas	6/13/1836	143-50	30-30	107-8	18	.64	Pass S. 178
24	Michigan	6/13/1836	96-59	4-42	91-3	11	.81	Proper Election on Michigan Representative
24	Michigan	1/25/1837	140-57	20-37	116-5	24	.58	3rd Reading of S. 81
24	Michigan	1/25/1837	132-43	22-32	103-2	24	.44	Pass S. 81
28	Texas	3/15/1844	121-39	18-35	103-2	5	.87	Do Not Annex Texas
28	Texas, Oregon	3/25/1844	66-106	4-54	62-48	24	.64	Table Annexing Texas and Oregon
28	Texas	6/13/1844	123-56	10-54	113-0	5	.91	Texas Annex. Unconstitutional
28	Texas	12/19/1844	109-61	6-56	103-2	7	.89	Refer Tex. to Committee of the Whole
28	Texas	1/10/1845	81-92	21-41	60-49	25	.69	Divide Texas into 2 States
28	Texas	1/15/1845	127-31	31-24	94-5	31	.00	Introduce Texas Annex. Bill
28	Texas	1/22/1845	119-63	23-40	95-21	42	.33	Reject Annexation
28	Texas	1/25/1845	120-98	9-66	111-28	27	.72	Pass H.J. Res. 46
28	Florida	2/13/1845	75-121	20-50	55-67	10	.87	Do not allow 2 states in Florida
28	Florida, Iowa	2/13/1845	144-48	27-41	117-5	13	.73	Pass H.R. 497 Florida-Iowa Admission
28	Texas	2/28/1845	134-77	2-72	132-2	3	.96	Accept Senate Amendment
29	Texas	12/16/1845	142-52	20-48	120-1	6	.90	Table Admission of Texas
29	Texas	12/16/1845	141-58	20-50	120-3	6	.90	Admit Texas
29	Wisconsin	2/16/1847	81-58	9-45	72-11	19	.67	Give Education Land Grant to WI
29	Wisconsin	2/19/1847	41-92	4-41	37-49	17	.59	Public Works in Wisconsin
30	Wisconsin	5/11/1848	94-46	43-31	50-15	49	-.07	WI Adm. to Exclude Public Lands from Sale

For the votes on Michigan and Arkansas, the first entry in the vote splits shows the votes for the Jacksonian position. The breakdown is shown first for the entire House (Margin) and then for the Jackson and Anti-Jackson factions. See note to Table 2 for explanation of errors and PRE. The votes for the two factions do not equal the margin because of the presence of Anti-Masonics and Nullifiers. As many as two Whig votes are included with the Anti-Jacksons for 1837 votes.

For all other votes, the first entry in the vote splits shows the votes for the Southern Democratic position. The breakdown is shown first for the entire House (Margin) and then for the Democratic and Whig parties. See note to Table 2 for explanation of errors and PRE. Party votes do not total the margins because of Law and Order, Ind. Dem., and Ind. Whig members.

Table 4
Statehood Roll Calls in Senate, 1834-1846

Congress	States	Date	Margin	Anti-Jackson Or Whig	Jackson Or Democrat	Class. Errors	PRE	Vote Description
23	Michigan	5/9/1834	20-14	7-12	13-1	7	.50	Table Authorization to Form State
23	Arkansas	5/12/1834	20-22	4-20	16-1	4	.80	Table Authorization to Form State
23	Arkansas	6/26/1834	17-15	4-12	13-1	2	.87	Authorize People of AR to Form State Govt.
24	Michigan	4/1/1836	28-9	9-6	22-0	8	.11	Congress, Not Pres., Decides MI Admission
24	Michigan	4/1/1836	23-12	1-12	22-0	2	.83	Do Not Seat MI Delegation Immediately
24	Michigan	4/1/1836	23-14	1-12	22-0	2	.86	Do Not Let Aliens Vote in MI
24	Michigan	4/1/1836	24-7	2-7	22-0	1	.86	Designate Only Part of MI as State
24	Michigan	6/9/1836	24-20	19-4	5-15	5	.75	No Tax on MI Lands
24	Michigan	1/3/1837	22-16	1-13	21-1	2	.88	Adjourn during Debate
24	Michigan	1/4/1837	25-12	1-10	24-1	2	.83	Amend MI Admission, re Preamble & Boundaries
24	Michigan	1/5/1837	25-10	2-9	23-0	1	.90	Pass MI Admission Bill
28	Texas	5/13/1844	18-23	5-17	13-5	5	.72	Make Texas Debate Non-Secret
28	Texas	6/6/1844	12-27	4-19	8-7	4	.67	Receive Friends Slavery Report
28	Texas	6/8/1844	16-35	1-27	15-7	4	.75	Ratify Annexation
28	Texas	6/13/1844	20-25	1-23	19-1	2	.90	Table Annexation Bill
28	Texas	2/5/1845	23-22	1-21	22-0	1	.96	Refer Annex. Bill to Committee
28	Florida, Iowa	2/14/1845	23-24	1-23	22-0	1	.96	Refer FL-IA to Committee
28	Texas	2/24/1845	30-11	10-10	20-0	4	.64	Consider H.J. Res. 46
28	Texas	2/27/1845	33-16	9-15	23-1	11	.31	No Debt Assump., Slavery Dec. by People of State
28	Texas	2/27/1845	27-25	3-24	24-0	3	.88	Request President to Negotiate with Texas
28	Texas	2/27/1845	33-11	9-10	24-0	6	.46	Divide Texas into Slave & Non-Slave States
28	Florida, Iowa	2/28/1845	23-26	0-25	23-0	0	1.00	Postpone Order of Day
28	Florida	3/1/1845	35-12	11-11	24-0	1	.92	Amend FL Constitution Slavery Provision
28	Florida, Iowa	3/1/1845	36-9	12-8	24-0	3	.67	Pass H.R. 497
29	Texas	3/11/1845	23-20	1-20	22-0	1	.95	Postpone Consideration
29	Texas	3/12/1845	32-9	11-9	21-0	5	.44	Amend Resolution
29	Texas	12/22/1845	31-13	5-13	26-0	0	1.00	Order 3rd Reading, Admit Texas
29	Iowa	12/24/1846	40-2	17-1	23-1	5	-1.50	Amend H.R. 557

For the votes on Michigan and Arkansas, the first entry in the vote splits shows the votes for the Jacksonian position. The breakdown is shown first for the entire Senate (Margin) and then for the Jackson and Anti-Jackson factions. See note to Table 2 for explanation of errors and PRE. The votes for the two factions do not equal the margin because of the presence of two Nullifiers from South Carolina. As many as two Whig votes are included with the Anti-Jacksons for 1837 votes.

For all other votes, the first entry in the vote splits shows the votes for the Southern Democratic position. The breakdown is shown first for the entire Senate (Margin) and then for the Democratic and Whig parties. See note to Table 2 for explanation of errors and PRE. Party votes do not total the margins because of Law and Order, Ind. Dem., and Ind. Whig members.

Table 5
Statehood and Slavery Roll Calls in House of Representatives 1857-1876

Congress	States	Date	Margin	Republican	Democrat	Amer.	Class. Errors	PRE	Vote Description
34	Minnesota	1/31/1857	98-76	60-19	30-29	7-27	25	.57	Pass Authorization for People of Minn. to Form State
35	Minnesota	5/11/1858	117-72	48-29	69-30	0-13	64	.11	Only One House Seat for Minn.
35	Minnesota	5/11/1858	51-141	38-40	0-99	12-2	49	.04	New Constitution + 2 Reps.
35	Minnesota	5/11/1858	157-39	57-21	100-3	0-14	44	-.13	Pass S. 86
35	Oregon	5/18/1858	115-104	15-71	98-20	0-11	38	.64	Pass S. 239
36	Kansas	4/12/1860	135-72	105-0	21-48	-	23	.68	Pass H.R. 23
36	Kansas (2/3 req.)	1/28/1861	119-41	92-0	16-22	-	19	.54	Consider Amendment to H.R. 23
36	New Mexico	3/1/1861	71-115	27-77	28-20	-	57	.20	Table H.R. 1008
37	W. Virginia	7/16/1862	70-45	61-18	2-11	-	25	.44	Table S. 365
37	W. Virginia	12/10/1862	97-58	84-10	4-32	-	20	.66	Pass S. 365
37	CO, NV (2/3 req.)	3/3/1863	65-47	60-5	1-27	-	9	.81	Consider S. 523 & S. 524
38	Colorado	3/17/1864	88-18	64-0	9-15	-	2	.89	Amend S. 97, Striking Prohibition of Slavery in CO
38	Nebraska	3/17/1864	72-43	58-0	2-36	-	1	.98	Amend H.R. 14 to require census before entry
39	Colorado	5/3/1866	109-29	102-5	0-24	-	6	.79	Table S. 74
39	Colorado	5/3/1866	74-64	67-37	1-25	-	36	.44	Refer S. 74 to Committee
39	Colorado	5/3/1866	82-58	74-31	0-25	-	31	.47	Pass S. 74
39	Nebraska	1/15/1867	105-55	99-10	0-34	-	12	.78	Pass S. 456
39	Colorado	1/15/1867	94-60	87-17	0-32	-	18	.70	Pass S. 462
39	Nebraska	2/9/1867	122-44	112-5	0-33	-	6	.86	Pass S. 456 over Johnson Veto
42	Colorado	1/29/1873	65-122	53-42	7-73	-	48	.26	Table H.R. 148
43	New Mexico	5/21/1874	161-55	122-26	37-27	-	46	.16	Pass H.R. 2418
43	Colorado	6/8/1874	170-66	138-24	30-40	-	44	.33	Pass H.R. 435
43	CO,NM (2/3 req.)	3/3/1875	164-83	153-13	10-67	-	21	.75	Pass Res. Regarding Admission of CO & NM
43	CO (2/3 req.)	3/3/1875	166-78	152-7	11-66	-	16	.80	Concur in Sen. Amends to H.R. 435
43	NM (2/3 req.)	3/3/1875	155-86	146-16	7-67	-	18	.79	Concur in Sen. Amends to H.R. 2418
44	Colorado	12/4/1876	95-147	77-0	145-14	-	16	.83	Previous Question on Res. Admitting Colorado
44	Colorado	12/4/1876	99-142	78-0	144-15	-	16	.84	Pass Res. to Determine if CO Is a State

Notes: The first entry in the vote splits shows the votes for the pro-expansion position. The breakdown is shown first for the entire House (Margin) and then for the Republican, Democratic, and American parties. See note to Table 2 for explanation of errors and PRE.

Table 6
Statehood Roll Calls in Senate, 1857-1876

Congress	States	Date	Margin	Republican	Democrat	Amer.	Class. Errors	PRE	Vote Description
34	Minnesota	2/21/1857	24-27	9-8	15-18	0-1	11	.54	Amend H.R. 642, Only Citizens Vote
34	Minnesota	2/21/1857	47-1	15-1	31-0	1-0	0	1.00	Pass H.R. 642
34	Minnesota	2/24/1857	21-35	6-13	14-22	1-0	13	.38	Reconsider Vote on H.R. 642
34	Minnesota	2/25/1857	31-24	12-9	19-15	0-1	14	.42	Reconsider Vote to Restrict Vote to American Citizens
34	Minnesota	2/25/1857	31-22	13-6	18-15	0-1	11	.50	Pass H.R. 642
35	Minnesota	4/1/1858	21-29	18-0	2-26	1-2	5	.76	2 Reps. Until Next Apportionment
35	Minnesota	4/7/1858	49-3	19-0	26-2	3-1	3	.00	Pass S. 86
35	Minnesota	4/13/1858	24-30	19-0	3-27	2-2	0	1.00	Disagree to House & Request Conference
35	Oregon	5/18/1858	35-17	11-6	23-7	1-3	5	.38	Pass S. 239
36	Kansas	6/7/1860	27-32	25-0	2-32	0-0	2	.93	Proceed to Consider H.R. 23
36	Kansas	1/21/1861	36-16	26-0	9-15	1-1	2	.88	Pass H.R. 23
37	West Virginia	7/7/1862	17-18	12-13	1-3	-	17	.000	Consider S. 365
37	West Virginia	7/14/1862	25-11	19-7	1-3	-	9	.18	Consider S. 365
37	West Virginia	7/14/1862	23-17	21-7	1-5	-	9	.47	Pass S. 365
37	West Virginia	2/26/1863	28-12	25-0	1-8	-	0	1.00	Consider S. 531, supplement to S. 365
37	Nevada	3/3/1863	24-16	18-7	4-5	-	9	.44	Pass S. 524
37	Colorado	3/3/1863	16-20	14-11	0-6	-	12	.25	Postpone consideration of S. 522
37	Colorado	3/3/1863	18-17	14-9	2-4	-	9	.47	Pass S. 253
37	Nebraska	3/3/1863	25-11	14-8	7-1	-	11	.00	Consider S. 522
37	Nebraska	3/3/1863	12-23	3-21	6-0	-	4	.67	Postpone consideration of S. 522
39	Colorado	3/13/1866	16-22	12-13	2-6	-	16	.00	Order 3rd Reading of S. 74
39	Colorado	4/25/1866	21-17	17-7	0-6	-	4	.77	Reconsider Vote Refusing 3rd Reading of S. 74
39	Colorado	4/25/1866	21-14	17-7	0-6	-	4	.72	Pass S. 74
39	Nebraska	7/27/1866	24-7	21-5	2-2	-	5	.29	Consider S. 447
39	Nebraska	1/9/1867	24-15	21-8	0-6	-	6	.60	Pass S. 456
39	Colorado	1/16/1867	23-11	20-5	0-5	-	4	.64	Amend S. 462
39	Nebraska	2/8/1867	31-9	28-4	0-4	-	2	.78	Override Veto of S. 456
39	CO (vet sustain)	3/1/1867	29-19	26-10	0-8	-	7	.63	Pass S. 462
43	Colorado	6/23/1874	20-33	20-15	3-11	-	16	.20	Table Motion to Consider H.R. 435
43	Colorado	2/24/1875	47-17	39-0	2-12	-	5	.71	Pass H.R. 435
43	New Mexico	2/24/1875	31-11	26-5	4-6	-	6	.46	Pass H.R. 435
44	New Mexico	3/8/1876	21-29	21-11	0-28	-	6	.72	Consider S. 229

Notes: The first entry in the vote splits shows the votes for the pro-expansion position. The breakdown is shown first for the entire Senate (Margin) and then for the Republican and Democratic parties. See note to Table 2 for explanation of errors and PRE.

In the case of Minnesota, there is some ambiguity in what is pro-admission. Some of the votes on the number of representatives may have been strategic. The vote corresponding to the majority vote among Opposition/Republicans is taken as pro-admission. A Yea vote has been coded pro-admission.

Table 7
Statehood Roll Calls in House, 1882-1911

Congress	States	Date	Margin	Republican	Democrat	Class. Errors	PRE	Vote Description
47	Dakota	7/17/1882	103-45	98-3	0-72	4	.95	Adopt H.R. 4456
47	Dakota	2/5/1883	152-110	139-1	6-106	7	.95	Pass H.R. 4672
49	Dak, MT, WA	2/18/1887	112-123	111-0	1-121	1	.99	Fix Day to Hear Bills on Admission of Dak, WA, MT
50	South Dakota	1/18/1889	119-122	113-0	2-120	3	.98	Amend S. 185
50	ND, MT, WA, NM	1/18/1889	133-120	0-120	129-0	1	.92	Amend S. 185 with New Bill, H.R. 8466
50	South Dakota	1/18/1889	118-131	118-0	0-127	1	.99	Recommit S. 185
50	South Dakota	1/18/1889	145-98	12-98	129-0	12	.88	Pass S. 185
50	South Dakota	1/18/1889	91-108	91-2	0-102	1	.99	Adopt Preamble to S. 185
50	South Dakota	2/14/1889	137-103	127-0	7-38	7	.93	Agree to 2nd Division of Amend. to S. 185
50	South Dakota	2/14/1889	145-110	127-0	15-108	15	.86	Table Motion to Reconsider Vote on 2nd Division
50	SD, ND, MT, WA	2/14/1889	148-102	128-0	17-99	16	.84	Agree to 3rd Division of Amend. to S. 185
51	Wyoming	3/11/1890	125-119	122-0	0-116	0	1.00	To consider H.R. 982
51	Wyoming	3/26/1890	142-139	141-1	0-128	1	.99	Recommit H.R.982 to Comm on Terr. (Nay is pro-expansion)
51	Wyoming	3/26/1890	139-127	138-1	0-126	1	.99	To pass H.R. 982
51	Idaho	4/3/1890	126-112	124-0	0-111	0	1.00	To amend H.R. 4562 to provide for convention
51	Idaho	4/3/1890	121-104	118-0	2-104	2	.98	To require const referendum (Nay is pro-expansion)
51	Idaho	4/3/1890	130-2	127-0	1-1	-	-	To pass H.R. 4562
52	New Mexico	6/6/1892	174-13	2-13	164-0	2	.85	Pass H.R. 7136
53	Utah	12/8/1893	148-6	1-2	137-4	5	.17	To consider H.R. 352
53	Utah	12/8/1893	158-33	9-29	140-4	12	.64	Call of the House during debate on H.R. 352
53	Arizona	12/15/1893	187-62	27-56	150-6	21	.66	To pass H.R. 4393
53	New Mexico	6/27/1894	117-84	1-72	113-7	11	.87	To amend H.R. 353 to req. English in schools (nay is pro-exp.)
53	New Mexico	6/27/1894	115-81	0-70	112-5	7	.91	To amend H.R. 353 to req. English in schools (nay is pro-exp.)
58	OK, AZ, NM	4/19/1904	151-112	148-2	0-109	2	.98	Agree to H. Res. 331, Ordering Consideration of H.R. 14749
58	OK, AZ, NM	4/19/1904	148-104	144-2	0-102	2	.98	Pass H.R. 14749
58	OK, NM	2/17/1905	160-127	159-0	0-127	0	1.00	Previous Ques. H. Res. 497, Discharge Petition on H.R. 14749
58	OK, NM	2/17/1905	161-127	158-1	0-126	1	.99	Pass H. Res. 497
59	Oklahoma	1/24/1906	192-165	192-43	0-122	29	.82	Previous Question on H. Res. 192
59	Oklahoma	1/24/1906	188-158	188-36	0-122	28	.82	Adopt H. Res. 192
59	Oklahoma	1/24/1906	195-150	195-33	0-177	25	.83	To pass H.R. 12707
59	Oklahoma	3/22/1906	173-153	173-42	0-111	32	.77	Prev. Quest, on H. Res. 372 (Remove HR12707 from Speaker)
59	Oklahoma	3/22/1906	175-156	175-41	0-115	32	.78	Adopt H. Res. 372 (Remove H.R 12707 from Speaker)
62	NM,AZ	5/23/1911	225-65	36-58	177-0	19	.71	Recommit H.J. Res. 14 (Nay is pro-expansion)

Notes: The first entry in the vote splits shows the votes for the pro-expansion position. The breakdown is shown first for the entire House (Margin) and then for the Republican and Democratic parties. See note to Table 2 for explanation of errors and PRE.

Table 8
Statehood Roll Calls in Senate, 1884-1911

Congress	States	Date	Margin	Republican	Democrat	Class. Errors	PRE	Vote Description
48	South Dakota	3/24/1884	35-26	29-0	2-23	2	.92	Make Special Order for S. 1682
48	South Dakota	12/9/1884	34-25	33-0	0-25	0	1.00	Consider S. 1682
48	South Dakota	12/16/1884	36-32	33-0	0-28	0	1.00	Pass S. 1682
49	South Dakota	2/5/1886	39-27	31-0	1-22	1	.96	Pass S. 967
49	WA,MT	4/8/1886	22-27	0-23	19-0	0	1.00	Amend S. 67
49	Washington	4/10/1886	39-15	26-0	4-13	4	0.73	Pass S. 67
50	South Dakota	4/19/1888	36-26	26-0	0-23	0	1.00	Pass S. 185
51	AZ,ID,NM,WY	6/27/1890	23-35	0-29	18-0	0	1.00	Amend H.R. 982, Substitute New Bill
51	AZ,ID,NM,WY	6/27/1890	18-34	0-29	18-0	0	1.00	Amend H.R. 982
51	WY, ID	6/27/1890	35-20	29-0	0-18	0	1.00	Pass H.R. 982
58	OK, AZ,NM	1/5/1905	32-19	31-1	0-16	1	.95	Consider H.R. 14749
58	OK, AZ,NM	1/5/1905	32-19	31-1	0-16	1	.95	Recommit H.R. 14749
58	OK,AZ,NM	2/7/1905	36-40	11-26	0-28	8	.78	Amend H.R. 14749, eliminating NM & AZ
61	AZ,NM	6/16/1910	42-22	42-0	0-19	0	1.00	Agree to Amendment to H.R. 18166
61	AZ,NM	6/16/1910	65-0	44-0	21-0	-	-	Pass H.R. 18166
61	AZ,NM	3/4/1911	39-45	14-42	25-3	6	.85	Amend H.J. Res. 295
62	AZ,NM	8/8/1911	56-19	23-16	30-2	11	.42	Pass H.J. Res. 14
62	AZ,NM	8/18/1911	59-9	26-7	27-2	7	.22	Pass S.J. Res. 57

Notes: The first entry in the vote splits shows the votes for the pro-expansion position. The breakdown is shown first for the entire Senate (Margin) and then for the Republican and Democratic parties. See note to Table 2 for explanation of errors and PRE.

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Notes

[1] Alaska and Hawaii became states in 1960.

[2] For theoretical work that formalizes many of the considerations in the remainder of this section, see Bolton and Roland (1997), Alesina and Spoloare (1999), and Farrel and Scotchmer (1988).

[3] Since distributive issues arise in firms with regard to nepotism, gender, racial, and religious discrimination and interpersonal liking, the distinction between firms and Congress is a matter of degree.

[4] Technically, *land tenure* refers to the manner in which and the period for which *rights in land are held*. In this regard, property is *rights*, not *things*. "The things are property objects, and tenure is concerned with rights in these things" (Harris, 1970, p.2). Tenure in land is a *bundle of rights* and rights in land held by a private party is an *estate in land*. See Harris (1970, pp.1-10) for a full discussion of these definitions.

[5] In feudal England these were: 1) Homage; 2) Fealty; 3) Wardship; 4) Marriage; 5) Relief; 6) *primer seisin*; 7) Aids; 8) fines for Alienation; and 9) Escheat. See Harris, 1970, pp. 25-27 for a full discussion of these definitions.

[6] Technically, the characteristics of *free and common socage* were: 1) it was perpetual; 2) it could be inherited; 3) it could be passed in a will; 4) obligations were fixed and certain (see note 3); 5) the owner had the right to waste; 6) it was freely alienable (you could sell it, etc.).

[7] Article V states that "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate."

[8] We point out that the "balance" rule, were it a credible commitment, was likely to be more symbolic than linked to any actual considerations of institutional rules. First, the South could have blocked ratification of any constitutional amendment dealing with slavery with only 1/4, not 1/2 of the states. Second, a sufficiently large minority can successfully filibuster any legislation in the Senate.

[9] For the Southern states, the percentage of the total population that were slaves in 1820 was: Alabama, 33%; Delaware, 23%; Georgia, 44%; Kentucky, 23%; Louisiana, 52%; Maryland, 36%; Mississippi, 44%; North Carolina, 34%; South Carolina, 53%; Tennessee, 20%; and Virginia, 50% (Source, *Historical Statistics of the United States*, series A 195-209).

[10] See Poole and Rosenthal (1997, ch. 3) for a detailed discussion of the fit of the model.

[11] For space reasons, we are presenting only the votes that we feel are important or that illustrate a central feature of the politics of statehood. Therefore, many procedural motions and minor amendments are not included. A complete list of votes is available on request.

[12] Michigan was part of the old Northwest Territory, which was closed to slavery by the Land Ordinance of 1787.

[13] In the area bounded by the 1818 Treaty with Great Britain (that set the northern boundary), the 1819 Treaty with Spain (that set the southern boundary), and the original Louisiana Purchase, the states formed after Missouri were Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas (portion), Arkansas, Oklahoma (portion), Wyoming (portion), Montana (portion), and a small piece of Colorado. Arkansas and Oklahoma were below $36^{o}30'$.

[14] The larger margins on these votes may reflect members normally voting pro-slavery but close to the cutting line voting to uphold the House as an institution vis à vis the Senate.

[15] Morison and Commager, 1950, p. 583

[16] Cited by Morison and Commager, 1950, pp. 583-584.

[17] On the Panic of 1819 and the collapse of land prices, see Rothbard (1962).

[18] It is important to note that at this time the Republic of Texas had not committed itself to annexation. It still held out the possibility of signing a treaty with Britain that would have guaranteed its independence from Mexico and the United States.

[19] Opponents did not see this as much of a compromise as Texas could forgo that territory, which many felt it was not legitimately entitled to, while creating four states below the compromise line.

[20] It is not clear whether this choice was made primarily to expand slavery or to avoid re-opening negotiations at a time when delay could have led to an increase in British influence in North America.

[21] Both the Webster and Bell plans called for a state stretching from the Colorado River on the north and the Rio Grande on the South.

[22] There was, however, a 6 percentage point increase over his performance in the same states in 1860.

[23] This section draws heavily from Foner (1988).

[24] In spite of House passage of New Mexico and Arizona statehood bills, an endorsement from President Cleveland, and a favorable (and bipartisan) committee report, the bills never were brought up on the Senate floor (Larson, 1968).

[25] One possible reason for this failure was the opposition of the territorial governor to statehood (see Larson 1968).

[26] Another factor may well have been residual eastern indignation over the territorial government's role in a well publicized massacre of Indians at Sand Creek in 1864. In the minds of Easterners, the incident undermined confidence in Colorado's ability to govern itself.

[27] As a form of retribution, the Democratic-controlled House voted in December 1876 to investigate the legality of Colorado's statehood.

[28] The Republican schizophrenia on New Mexico had become epic.

[29] Church leaders did not want to alienate Democratic supporters of statehood. They also sought to build Republican support for statehood. Consequently, they carefully orchestrated the mobilization of the Church's followers into roughly equal Republican and Democratic contingents (Lyman 1986).

[30] It was reported out of the Republican-controlled Committee on Territories (Larson 1968).

[31] New Mexico's Democratic delegate blamed the defeat on a Republican filibuster of an appropriations bill unrelated to statehood.

Figure 1

SLAVES FREE IN MO. AT AGE 25

Tallmadge Amendment



Dark Gray are yea votes,
black are no votes

Dark gray = yea
Black = no
Light gray = abstain

Striped = multi-member



Figure 2

PROHIBIT SLAVERY IN MO.

House #16 Roll Call #18 3/1/1820 (1/1)



Figure 3

TARIFFS

House #16 Roll Call #65 4/29/1820 (1/1)



Dark Gray are yea votes, black are no votes



Figure 4

$800,000 FOR FORTIFICATIONS

House #16 Roll Call #23 3/14/1820 (1/1)



Dark Gray are yea votes, black are no votes

Dark gray = yea
Black = no
Light gray = abstain

Striped = multi-member



Figure 5


Percentage of Whig Presidential Victories 1836-1848
1 to 1 (8)
0.75 to 1 (5)
0.5 to 0.75 (4)
0.25 to 0.5 (4)
0 to 0.25 (9)


Percentage of Whig House Victories
0.633 to 0.845 (6)
0.422 to 0.633 (8)
0.211 to 0.422 (8)
0 to 0.211 (10)

Figure 6


Percentage of House Seats Won by Whigs
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Election Cycle
1834
1836
1838
1840
1842
1844
1846
1848
1850
1852
Slave
Free

Figure 7

SLAVERY AND TEXAS &DEBI
House #28 Roll Call #481 1/25/1845

Light Tokens are Yea Votes
Dark Tokens are Nay Votes
D=No. Dem., S=So. Dem., I=Ind.,
L =Law & Order, W = Whig,
Brown's Token is Circled



The Brown (W-TN) Amendment on Texas Annexation

Party Breakdown

Num	Party	Yea	Nay
80	Whig	9	67
58	Northern Whig	0	55
22	Southern Whig	9	12
152	Democrat	109	30
92	Northern Democrat	56	30
60	Southern Democrat	53	0
1	Ind. Democrat	0	1
2	Law and Order	0	2
1	Ind. Whig	0	1

Figure 8



Party Breakdown

Num	Party	Yea	Nay
	Whig	3	24
	Northern Whig	1	15
	Southern Whig	2	9
	Democrat	24	0
	Northern Democrat	15	0
	Southern Democrat	9	0
	Law and Order	0	1

Lightest Tokens and States Voted Yea
Intermediate States Were Split Delegations
Darkest Tokens and States Voted Nay
D=No. Dem., S= So. Dem., W=Whig,
L=Law and Order



Order Third Reading of Texas Annexation Bill

Figure 9

Party Breakdown

Num	Party	Yea	Nay
84	Whig	20	50
59	Northern Whig	1	50
25	Southern Whig	19	0
150	Democrat	120	3
87	Northern Democrat	72	3
63	Southern Democrat	48	0
6	American	1	5

Final Passage, House, Admission of Texas



Blank Districts Abstained or Were Not Represented
Light Shaded Districts and Tokens Voted For Admission of Texas
Dark Shaded Districts and Tokens Voted Against Admission of Texas

ADMIT TEXAS INTO UNION
House #29 Roll Call #21 12/16/1845





Figure 10

Light Tokens Are Yea Votes
Dark Tokens Are Nay Votes
D=No. Dem.
S=So. Dem
W=Whig

ADMIT TEXAS TO UNION (PROC)
Senate #29 Roll Call #18 12/22/1845



Roll Call Statistics

Party Breakdown

Num	Party	Yea	Nay
26	Whig	5	13
17	Northern Whig	0	13
9	Southern Whig	5	0
39	Democrat	26	0
18	Northern Democrat	13	0
21	Southern Democrat	13	0
1	Liberty	0	0

Order Third Reading of Texas Annexation Bill

Figure 11


Senate Representation 1862-1920
Percentage of Seat-Years
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
NE
NV
KS
MT
ND
WA
SD
UT
WV
WY
CO
ID
AZ
OK
NM
Republican
Democrat
Other

Figure 12


The Senate 1870-1920
Mean NOMINATE Score
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
1871
1875
1879
1883
1887
1891
1895
1899
1903
1907
1911
1915
1919
Republicans
New State (REP)
New State (All)
Democrats
All Senators

Figure 13


Support of Republican Position: Tariff
Percentage
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
38 39 40 41 42 43 47 48 50 51 53 54 55 57 61 62 63 64 65 66
Congress
Old State Republicans
New State Republicans
Democrats

Figure 14


Support of Republican Position: Currency
Percentage
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
40 41 42 43 44 45 46 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 59 60 63 64 65
Congress
Old State Republicans
New State Republicans
Democrats