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## DIMENSIONS OF CANDIDATE EVALUATION\*

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The story of a presidential election year is in many ways the story of the actions and interactions of those considered as possible candidates for their nation's highest office. If this is true in the abstract, it certainly was true in the election of 1968. The political headlines of 1968 were captured by those who ran for the nominations of their parties, those who pondered over whether or not to run, those who chose to pull out of the race or were struck down during the campaign, those who raised a third party banner, and those who resisted suggestions to run outside the two-party structure. While 1968 may have been unusual in the extent to which many prospective candidates dominated the political scene, every presidential election is, in its own way, highlighted by those considered for the office of President.

The political scientist has shown scholarly interest in the candidates. His interest, however, has been selective in its focus—mainly concentrating on the two actual party nominees and not the larger set of possible presidential candidates. Research in electoral behavior has detailed the popular image of the nominees in terms of the public's reactions to their record and experience, personal qualities, and party affiliation. Furthermore, attitudes toward the nominees have been shown to constitute a major short-term influence on the vote.<sup>1</sup> Yet attitudes

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, A. Campbell, G. Gurin, and

toward other candidates have been surveyed only to ascertain the behavior of those people who favored someone other than the ultimate nominees. The focus in the discipline remains on the nominees—feelings toward them and willingness to accept them.

As research moves from an exclusive concern with explanation of the election outcomes, more scholarly attention should be given to popular attitudes toward the full spectrum of possible candidates. Much remains to be learned about voters' perceptions of the candidates. We still know very little about the psychological dimensions of meaning involved in how an individual perceives, reacts to, and evaluates a set of candidates. We know little about the more general organizing concepts a person uses in developing the specific perceptions and reactions described in contemporary voting and public opinion surveys. In this paper, we shall seek a dimensional interpretation of the individual's perceptions of and preferences for candidates. Extending the set of candidates beyond the bounds of the two nominees allows us to search out broader meanings of candidate evaluation.

While little is known about the factors leading to differing patterns of candidate evaluation, the voting behavior literature suggests a variety of factors as relevant guidelines in any initial inquiries. The most obvious long-term factor is partisan identification. This psychological attachment to party has been treated as a major influence on the vote and research has shown that it can color voters' perceptions of the nominees. The various twists such a factor can take with a larger set of candidates will be a continuing theme of this paper.

Additional factors which may affect candidate evaluation include a person's ideology, the issues

W. E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954); A. Campbell, P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller, and D. E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960); D. E. Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," this REVIEW, 60 (March 1966), 19-28.

of the day, and the personality of the candidates. The crucial task is to distinguish which of these factors are important. A related theoretical question is the number of dimensions used as bases for candidate evaluation.

The pioneering work on the modelling of party competition by Anthony Downs was based on a unidimensional ideological continuum.<sup>2</sup> As Stokes has pointed out, Downs's notion of a unidimensional political space is only an assumption, since party competition could instead easily roam over a multidimensional space.<sup>3</sup> The problem of the number of dimensions should be seen as an empirical question. Evidence from surveys indicates that the American public often sees issues in multidimensional terms. Most researchers using dimensional analysis techniques on European multi-party systems have also found the assumption of a single ideological dimension to be inadequate. A prime example is Converse's skillful analysis of the French political scene which found two dimensions being used for the evaluation of that country's many parties.<sup>4</sup> Exploration of the dimensionality of perceptions of candidates in the United States may be one means of testing the dimensionality of the competition space within which national choices of leadership are made.

#### I. THE THERMOMETER QUESTION

The specific focus of this study will be on individual reactions to a set of twelve candidates for national office. Data will be taken from the interviews of over one thousand respondents in the 1968 election study of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center. A measure was needed to obtain the feelings of the respondents toward the several candidates. We felt that the respondent should be allowed to use those dimensions which come naturally to him, which are his normal guidelines for thinking about candidates. By obtaining such responses without imposing a frame of reference, it becomes possible in the analysis to deduce the dimensions of importance in the thought of individuals. We have employed a measuring device called the "feeling thermometer" which provides one such neutrally worded means of eliciting responses to a wide variety of candidates.

<sup>2</sup> A. Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).

<sup>3</sup> D. E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," this REVIEW, 57 (June 1963), 368-377.

<sup>4</sup> P. E. Converse, "The Problem of Party Distances in Models of Voting Change," in M. K. Jennings and L. H. Zeigler (eds.), *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

Basically a "feeling thermometer" is a question asking respondents to indicate on a 0-to-100-degree temperature scale how warm or cold they feel toward a set of objects—in this case, candidates.<sup>5</sup> If a person feels particularly warm or favorable toward a political figure, he would give that candidate a score somewhere between 50 and 100, depending on how warm his feeling was toward that candidate. If he felt cold or unfavorable toward that candidate, 0 to 50 degrees would be the appropriate scoring range. The actual score of 50 degrees was explained to the respondent to be for candidates about whom he felt neither particularly warm nor cold, a neutral point on the scale. To make the thermometer scale more concrete, a card listing nine temperatures throughout the scale range and their corresponding verbal meanings as to intensity of "hot" or "cold" feelings was handed to the respondent. A separate statement in the question wording attempted to elicit "don't know" responses to individual candidates when appropriate.

The twelve people the respondents were asked to rate on the feeling thermometer covered a wide range of possible presidential hopefuls and ideological streams. The names listed included the actual presidential nominees themselves—Nixon, Humphrey, and Wallace—and their vice-presidential running mates. Lyndon Johnson was included, being the incumbent President and considered at one time to be a candidate for re-election. The other five mentioned were the main presidential hopefuls discussed at length in the media who failed to get their parties' nominations—Eugene McCarthy, Ronald Reagan, Nelson Rockefeller, George Romney, and the late Robert Kennedy. This list is somewhat arbitrary, as any list of presidential hopefuls must be. Having the respondents rate twelve candidates is a reasonable task in a survey setting and yet provides enough information for a dimensional analysis of the candidate space. The vice-presidential nominees were included on a basically presidential-oriented list because of the use of the vice-presidential candidates as an issue in the 1968 campaign and the fact that they

<sup>5</sup> The thermometer question followed the basic format devised by A. R. Clausen for previous Survey Research Center studies, but was revised by the authors to apply to candidates rather than groups and to screen out "don't know" responses. The full wording of the question is given in the appendix. For other analysis involving this question in the 1968 election study, see P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller, J. G. Rusk, and A. C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics," this REVIEW, 63 (December 1969), 1083-1105.

are increasingly considered to be an integral part of the presidential race.

The responses to the twelve candidates can initially be conceived of as indicating each individual's feelings toward each given candidate. Additionally, we shall interpret the relative scores given to the candidates as indicating a person's preference order for these twelve candidates. A respondent is assumed to prefer most the candidate to whom he gives the highest score, and so on. While it must be admitted that there may not be a perfect correspondence between an individual's relative scores and his preference order, the use of the thermometer question constitutes one of the simplest means of obtaining preference orders over a large number of alternatives in a survey of the mass public. More conventional ranking of a dozen candidates would constitute a very difficult task for many respondents, whereas scoring the candidates on the thermometer scale was generally painless.

It should be pointed out that the thermometer question was asked *after* the election. This timing is likely to have affected the ratings of the candidates. A "bandwagon effect" in favor of president-elect Nixon must be considered likely. Humphrey was also probably evaluated much more favorably at this point of time than he would have been during the early part of the campaign, due to a combination of the increased party unity on his behalf and sympathy for his defeat. The tragedy of the assassination of Robert Kennedy could be expected to yield a more favorable rating for him than would have been obtained from a measurement during the period in which he was actively campaigning. Finally the vice-presidential candidates were probably near their peak of saliency at the moment of this study. The timing of the question will influence our measure of the relative appeal of the candidates, but we shall be able to minimize its effect on the dimensional analysis.

The first thing to explore about the data obtained from the thermometer question is their basic statistical parameters. By statistical parameters we mean the level of salience of the candidates and the differences in assessments of them as reflected in their central tendency and dispersion figures. Table 1 summarizes such descriptive features for the candidates included in the 1968 study.

An initial glance at the percentage of "don't know" replies in Table 1 comments to some extent on the salience of each candidate. The names of the candidates in 1968 were generally recognized by the public. The question was deliberately worded to invite "don't know" replies to the candidates when relevant, but very few

TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF CANDIDATE THERMOMETERS

Candidate	Don't Know	50°	Standard Deviation	Mean	First	Last
					Mentions*	Mentions*
Kennedy	1%	13%	26	70.1	43%	8%
Nixon	1	16	23	66.5	36	8
Humphrey	1	14	27	61.7	25	13
Muskie	8	31	22	61.4	16	10
Johnson	1	15	26	58.4	17	14
McCarthy	5	32	23	54.8	11	14
Rockefeller	4	30	22	53.8	9	15
Agnew	7	41	21	50.4	4	13
Reagan	5	34	22	49.1	5	17
Romney	8	46	19	49.0	3	15
LeMay	7	29	26	35.2	3	40
Wallace	2	13	31	31.4	11	62
N's	1315	1210	1210	1210	1304	1304
	1326	1311	1311	1311		

\* These columns add up to more than 100 percent because a respondent could give the same highest or lowest score to several candidates.

were given. The greatest proportion of "don't know" responses was only 8 percent for Romney and Muskie. The only other candidates receiving more than 6 percent "don't know's" were the remaining vice-presidential candidates. In particular, Humphrey, Nixon, Wallace, Johnson, and Kennedy were nearly universally recognized.

Although the surface level of salience was high, a substantial number of the thermometer scores did not indicate whether the respondent felt particularly warm or cold toward a given candidate. A score of 50 degrees could indicate either ambivalent feelings or no opinion. The proportions of 50's for the presidential nominees, the incumbent President, and the late Senator Kennedy were all quite small, but the other candidates showed a sizable concentration of such scores. The large number of 50 scores reflects a substantial lack of affective feeling toward some of the candidates and, in turn, qualifies our earlier discussion of their saliency. Some of the candidates are perceived in the most superficial terms while others have a more central place in the respondents' cognitive structures. There appears to be a major threshold for public evaluation of the candidates which can be passed only through an event of great importance such as the actual nomination. This threshold has implications for the subsequent analysis in that the differences in evaluations of the candidates could be related to their differences in saliency.

In general, the candidates were favorably perceived. The mean values in Table 1 show that most of the twelve political figures were given thermometer scores greater than 50, the break-even or neutral point on the scale.<sup>6</sup> Only

\* Mean values of all the candidates were drawn

George Wallace and his running mate Curtis Le-May scored significantly below 50. In fact over 60 percent of the sample gave George Wallace the lowest score that they gave to any of the candidates, a strong indication that he never succeeded in making a serious appeal to a majority of the electorate. On the popular side of the ledger, the late Robert Kennedy led the field. The two major presidential candidates also ranked high as did Humphrey's running mate. Lyndon Johnson was also seen in fairly positive terms.

The reasons for the generally positive perceptions are not completely clear and cannot be directly ascertained from the thermometer data. One necessary condition for a very favorable rating is the salience of the candidate. The candidates with the most favorable images were particularly well-known. A closely related argument is that the presidential race draws the better men in politics—men with a good image, record, and qualifications and the media publicity and coverage associated with these attributes. A third explanation might be the prestige and dignity associated with seeking the highest office in the land, though some deviant cases exist to question the generality of such a conclusion. Because the thermometer readings were taken after the election, it is difficult to know what explanation might best fit the major party nominees. They may have been nominated because of their public popularity or they may have achieved public popularity because of their nominations and the ensuing campaign and election.

As much as candidates were perceived favorably, individuals still were able to discriminate among those placed before them. Two types of discrimination resulted—variation of scores within candidates across all individuals and variation of an individual's scores across candidates. The standard deviation figures in Table 1 attest to the first type of discrimination. These figures show the considerable fluctuation in "feeling" recorded for each candidate across the set of respondents; such values range from 19 degrees

closer to the break-even point of 50 on the scale because of use by some respondents of the score of 50 degrees to indicate no feeling about the candidates, a meaning which was other than the intended meaning of neutral feelings. The differential in means between Wallace and LeMay would be all but erased if this factor were corrected by removing all 50 responses while the Muskie-Humphrey difference would be dramatically reversed. If the candidates given large numbers of 50's were better known, it is possible that they would have been received in much more favorable or unfavorable terms as the public would have been better able to judge them.

for Romney to 31 degrees for Wallace. A case-by-case inspection reveals the second type of discrimination; the set of twelve candidates was invariably perceived differently by any given individual. The average extent of the range of scores given by a respondent was 73 degrees out of the possible 100. The standard deviation of the values given by the average respondent was 23 degrees, compared to a theoretical maximum of 50 degrees. These two types of discrimination provide the ingredients necessary to justify any analysis of candidate evaluations.

In general, the statistical parameters of the thermometer question point to the recognition and positive evaluation of the candidates along with considerable discrimination among them. A notion of those liked and disliked was gained—a popularity scale was indeed in evidence and it showed the critical position of the presidential nominees. But the basis of these evaluations is yet to be explored. A search beyond the descriptive parameters of the thermometer scores to their underlying dimensions is needed in order to detect the antecedents of candidate evaluation.

## II. THE CANDIDATE SPACE

We shall begin a consideration of the dimensional properties of candidate evaluation with an analysis of the three actual presidential nominees by themselves. It is reasonable to expect that their central position in the campaign would accord them critical positions in the overall candidate space which we seek to describe. Then we shall turn our attention to the full set of candidates as a means of noting the relative positions they are assigned in that space.

Table 2 indicates the relative frequencies for the various preference orders for the three nominees.<sup>7</sup> A basic question is whether a single dimension can account for these preferences. A necessary condition for unidimensionality is that all the preference orders end with only two of the alternatives. If the respondents do employ only a single dimension, then their last place choice must be one of the two extreme alternatives on that dimension.<sup>8</sup> If, on the other hand,

<sup>7</sup> The relationship between these preference orders and the vote may be of some interest. Of those voters giving different scores to the three nominees, about 94 percent voted for the candidate they ranked highest while less than one percent voted for the candidate they ranked lowest. About 97 percent of those giving the two major party nominees their highest two rankings voted for their first choice, compared to only 82 percent of those giving Wallace one of their top two scores.

<sup>8</sup> These notions are based on C. H. Coombs's "unfolding analysis" discussed in his book, *A Theory*

TABLE 2. PREFERENCE ORDERS FOR NOMINEES\*

1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	Total	Blacks	White Democrats	White Independents	White Republicans
Humphrey	Nixon	Wallace	37%	93%	51%	25%	6%
Nixon	Humphrey	Wallace	37	4	19	42	70
Nixon	Wallace	Humphrey	9	0	7	12	13
Wallace	Nixon	Humphrey	9	0	8	15	8
Humphrey	Wallace	Nixon	5	3	10	3	1
Wallace	Humphrey	Nixon	3	0	5	3	2
<i>N</i> =			100% 997	100% 112	100% 344	100% 265	100% 251

\* Only the respondents giving different scores to the three nominees are included.

more than two alternatives receive substantial numbers of last place choices, then multidimensionality of preferences is indicated. Inspection of Table 2 indicates that Nixon received only 8 percent of the last place scores compared to more than twice as many for Humphrey and many times more for Wallace. These results are basically consistent with a single dimension ranging from Humphrey at one end to Wallace at the other end with Nixon in the middle. This pattern would fit quite well with the journalistic left-right interpretation of the 1968 election. Given the known low level of ideological thought among the mass public, we would assume that this dimension is based more on specific issues than on a general liberal-conservative ideology. We shall consider later the nature of the issues leading to this left-right dimension.

The evidence, however, is not unanimously in favor of a unidimensional left-right interpretation. The two bottom rows of Table 2 run counter to the dimensional model which predicts that Nixon would receive no last place choices. Five percent of the respondents gave Humphrey their first choice and reached across the continuum to allot Wallace their second rather than last choice, although this involved bypassing the middle position on the scale. Also a full quarter of the 117 Wallace supporters in the sample

of *Data* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), pp. 80-121. The assumption is that an individual choosing among alternative stimuli orders them in terms of their distance from his point of maximum preference. As a result, on a continuum from left to right ordered A, B, C, people may give only the preference orders ABC, BAC, BCA, and CBA. Preference orders with the middle scale item, B, in the third choice position would violate this model so the ACB and CAB patterns would be nonexistent under the condition of perfect unidimensionality.

gave Humphrey as their second choice, again violating the left-right dimension. While the overall level of fit is acceptable, we shall consider one further factor which may explain these deviations.

A model of partisan identification and its effects provides the additional explanatory power which is necessary. Party identifiers should give the lowest number of last place scores to the nominee of their party. Thus Democratic identifiers should give fewest last place choices to Humphrey, a prediction opposite to that of the left-right model. The two bottom rows of Table 2 are consistent with this notion of party identification for Democratic respondents but the two middle rows do not fit such an explanation. That fairly equal numbers of Democrats fall into each of these categories suggests that neither model is sufficient in itself.<sup>9</sup> In particular the 15 percent in each category would be a sizable level of error under any model. Predict-

<sup>9</sup> An alternate explanation of the behavior of Democratic identifiers is that support for Wallace would not be considered defection from the Democratic party in the South given the peculiarities of Southern politics. This hypothesis yields the same prediction we have specified for the party identification model among Democrats. However, the evidence in favor of the prediction of the party identification model is even stronger among the Democratic North than the Democratic South, which suggests that the effects of party identification are more fundamental than are those of Southern politics. While some respondents may have viewed Wallace as a Democratic candidate because of his background, we choose, partly for ease of exposition, to regard his candidacy as separate from either major party. At a minimum there is no evidence that he was viewed together with the remaining Democratic candidates.

tions from party identification and the left-right theory postulated here are the same in the case of Republican identifiers, so no new information is gleaned from this source. The combined impact of party identification and the left-right model indeed yields a very good fit for Republican identifiers with only 3 percent giving Nixon their last choice. The correspondence of the choice patterns of Independent identifiers to left-right ideas is significant since party identification theory makes no particular predictions for their behavior. Given these results, the left-right dimension is a better ideological discriminator for Republicans and Independents than for Democratic identifiers. The purity of the dimension as an ideological discriminator is lessened for Democratic identifiers because of the conflict for some of them between their party identification and the left-right model. The overall story is basically a reading of two important factors at work—ideology and party, with the former having more weight in the interpretation but with the latter retaining considerable residual explanatory power.

Now that we have considered the preferences for the nominees, we wish to turn to the full spectrum of candidates. The mapping of the full candidate space necessitates a shift in analysis procedure. Analysis of the raw preference orders for the twelve candidates is beyond the reasonable limitations of simple inspection and hand analysis—there being 1306 respondents giving meaningful preference orders (different scores to at least two candidates) with a total of 1301 distinct preference orders being given. The alternative which we shall adopt is to analyze the inter-correlations of candidate ratings.<sup>10</sup> Candidates

<sup>10</sup> The correlations measure the covariation in the ratings of candidate pairs. The average level of popularity of a candidate does not affect such covariation nor does the degree of dispersion in the scores given to a candidate. In particular, the covariation would not be altered by a linear transformation of the scores for a given candidate, such as a "bandwagon effect" which adds five degrees to every respondent's score for Nixon. All temporal effects need not involve simple linear transformations, but the covariation is less affected by such matters than the preference orders would be. Additionally, the use of the covariation measure may affect the distance between a pair of candidates in a spatial representation. A standard unfolding analysis would locate Nixon and Humphrey, for example, very near one another in a geometric space since large numbers of respondents rated both high. However, their correlation is actually a negative value,  $-.18$ . This indicates that the higher a re-

perceived in a similar fashion should have substantial positive correlations; those seen as quite dissimilar from one another should have sizable negative values. Correlation scores close to zero indicate an absence of shared perceptions of the candidates. The correlations among the three nominees, for example, are as follows:  $-.03$  between Nixon and Wallace;  $-.18$  between Humphrey and Nixon; and  $-.32$  between Humphrey and Wallace. The relative magnitudes of these values indicate the very same locations for the nominees on the dimension as revealed in the preference orders of Table 2; the largest negative value, between Humphrey and Wallace, points to the basic opposition of the two and hence their placement at opposite ends of the continuum. Inspection of the correlation matrix of Table 3 provides a similar indication of the dimensions underlying the full set of data.

One pattern of interest in the matrix is the relationship of Wallace and LeMay to other candidates. Their correlations are low and often negative. In particular, the two are viewed in opposition to the Democratic candidates, and the generality of this statement could extend to most of the other political figures as well. This suggests the possibility of a Wallace-non-Wallace dimension, though such a dimension could also have partisan and/or issue overtones.

Another pattern in the correlation matrix stands out quite vividly. Candidates belonging to the same party generally have high positive correlations which implies that they are perceived in a similar vein. The four highest correlations involve presidential-vice-presidential teams (including Johnson and Humphrey) and the next eight highest also involve pairs of candidates from the same party. All the intra-party correlations are positive.

Conversely, candidates from different parties are usually viewed as dissimilar or unlike each other. The correlations between Republicans and Democrats tend to be negative, though lower in absolute value than the intra-party correlations. These results buttress the earlier notion of party identification as an important variable affecting the processes of political perception. However, an exception to this patterning stands out. McCarthy, Rockefeller, and Romney, those outside of their parties' "mainstreams," are somewhat correlated with each other—about as much so as with members of their own party. A common bond of popular perceptions may link these

spondent rated one of them, the lower he tended to rate the other; thus, the two belong in opposite parts of the space.

TABLE 3. CORRELATIONS OF CANDIDATE THERMOMETERS\*

	H	M	K	J	Mc	Rk	Rm	A	N	Rg	L	W
Humphrey (H)	x											
Muskie (M)	.58	x										
Kennedy (K)	.53	.43	x									
Johnson (J)	.70	.46	.47	x								
McCarthy (Mc)	.25	.29	.36	.13	x							
Rockefeller (Rk)	.17	.27	.24	.16	.33	x						
Romney (Rm)	.17	.24	.26	.24	.33	.33	x					
Agnew (A)	-.10	-.03	-.01	-.04	.12	.14	.34	x				
Nixon (N)	-.18	-.09	-.13	-.09	.08	.13	.33	.60	x			
Reagan (Rg)	-.19	-.07	-.10	-.09	.09	.19	.31	.44	.41	x		
Lemay (L)	-.21	-.16	-.09	-.09	-.02	-.04	.10	.30	.11	.28	x	
Wallace (W)	-.32	-.26	-.22	-.23	-.13	-.14	-.06	.13	-.03	.20	.68	x

\* All correlations are Pearson r's.

three men together. Kennedy is also associated with them, but he has much higher correlations with the members of his party.

A "left-right" ideological dimension or some specific issue manifestation of it might be underlying these patterns and might be intermixed with the partisan factor. The Democratic candidates tending to be more liberal than the Republicans might explain part of the patterning in the matrix as might the extreme position taken by Wallace. A left-right dimension within each party might also explain the relative correlation values for the separate parties. The bipartisan correlations of McCarthy, Rockefeller, and Romney (and, to some extent, Kennedy with them) also suggest an ideological or issue interpretation.

The final comment to be made about the structure of the correlation matrix is that four clusters of candidates are evident. The two American Independent Party candidates form one cluster. Three of the five Republicans—Agnew, Nixon, and Reagan—have their highest intercorrelations with one another as do four of the five Democrats—Humphrey, Muskie, Kennedy, and Johnson. There also appears to be a weak bipartisan cluster involving McCarthy, Rockefeller, and Romney.

In general, the existence of discernible clusters within the correlation matrix indicates an important degree of structuring in this body of data. The relations within and between clusters, however, are difficult to gauge from inspection of the matrix. The fundamental role of party in organizing the correlations is evident from even the most general look at the matrix and there is

further evidence of a left-right dimension. However, the interrelationships between these dimensions cannot be found by simple inspection of the matrix. Closer inspection of the candidate space requires the use of a more sophisticated procedure for dimensional analysis.

We shall employ nonmetric multidimensional scaling<sup>11</sup> to obtain the dimensional solution which best explains the correlation patterns of Table 3. A nonmetric technique makes weaker assumptions than does factor analysis; it requires that only the ordering of the correlation values be considered as meaningful data and not the exact values themselves.<sup>12</sup> While making less

<sup>11</sup> See J. B. Kruskal, "Multidimensional Scaling by Optimizing Goodness of Fit to a Nonmetric Hypothesis," *Psychometrika*, 29 (March 1964), 1-27; J. B. Kruskal, "Nonmetric Multidimensional Scaling: A Numerical Method," *Psychometrika*, 29 (June 1964), 115-130. Also, L. Guttman, "A General Nonmetric Technique for Finding the Smallest Coordinate Space for a Configuration of Points," *Psychometrika*, 33 (December 1968), 469-506; J. C. Lingoes, "An IBM-7090 Program for Guttman-Lingoes Smallest Space Analysis—I," *Behavioral Science*, 10 (April 1965), 183-184; R. N. Shepard, "Metric Structures in Ordinal Data," *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 3 (July 1966), 287-315.

<sup>12</sup> There are several reasons why we have more faith in the order of the correlation values than in their exact magnitudes. First, individuals tended to restrict their responses to the nine scores cited on the thermometer card rather than using the full range provided by the thermometer analogy. Ordinal correlation values on such a nine point scale did

stringent assumptions, such nonmetric techniques have been shown to yield fairly unique solutions. Multidimensional scaling interprets the

not equal the correlation values earlier obtained, but the crucial point is that the order of such values was virtually identical for the two types of coefficients (Spearman's rho = .99). Second, some respondents may have given low scores to two candidates for opposite reasons—such as one candidate being too far to the left and the other too far to the right to satisfy the respondent. Giving similar low ratings to a pair of candidates adds to their correlation, even when the respondents involved actually saw the two candidates as quite distant from one another. This has little effect on correlations of candidates near one another in the space, but it may artificially increase the correlations between distant candidates. As a result, the negative correlations and some of the low positive correlations may be higher (in the direction of +1.0) than they should be, though the order of the correlations should be substantially unaffected. Third, all respondents did not necessarily translate the same feelings toward the candidates into the same thermometer values. Individuals could have different response set tendencies—some preferring to give candidates high scores and others tending to give them low scores, a result which would give an artificial positive boost to the correlation of any particular pair of candidates. Such slippage between a person's actual feelings and his verbal scoring of the candidates makes our correlations more positive (or less negative) than they should be. (A detailed proof of this regularity is beyond the scope of this paper.) One way to correct for this effect would be to compute correlations based on each individual's deviation scores from his mean; this, however, would destroy the entire meaningfulness of the thermometer scale and its "anchors" of 0, 50, and 100 degrees. The values obtained from such an operation would be different from our correlation values, but again the order of the two sets of correlations would be essentially similar. (In fact, the Spearman rho coefficient between the original correlations and those obtained by use of such deviation scores is .96, a value which is very high but which does permit some mismatch in the ordering of correlation values for given pairings of candidates.)

An additional consideration motivating the use of a nonmetric technique over factor analysis has to do with the proven tendency of the latter to overestimate the dimensionality of data of the type used here (C. H. Coombs, *A Theory of Data*, Ch. 8). Indeed some exploration with factor analysis on the thermometer data showed that it was supplying one more dimension than was uncovered by our use of a multidimensional scaling algorithm.

correlations as monotonic with distances—the closer to +1.00 the correlation between two items (candidates), the closer together should be their corresponding points in a geometric representation. A "goodness-of-fit" measure, called "stress," is calculated to indicate the extent to which the best solution achieved in a given number of dimensions satisfies a monotonic fit with the data. This stress value is at a minimum for the correct solution and increases sharply in value as the number of dimensions being used is cut too far below the correct number. The analysis of the correlation matrix of Table 3 yields a "fair" solution in one dimension with a stress of .108 and a "good" solution in two dimensions with a stress of .050.<sup>13</sup> We shall look at these two solutions, one at a time, in order to see what explanatory power each offers.

Figure 1 shows the best unidimensional solution which could be obtained.<sup>14</sup> Note first the partisan separation it provides. The Democratic candidates are at one end of the dimension, the American Independent Party candidates are at the other end, and the Republicans in between. Thus the partisan separation does not correspond to the usual party identification scale with Democrats and Republicans at opposite ends but rather parallels the order of the three nominees on a left-right dimension. The dimension of Figure 1 also distinguishes the clusters found in the correlation matrix. Humphrey, Johnson, Kennedy, and Muskie form one tight cluster and Agnew, Nixon, and Reagan form a second. McCarthy, Rockefeller, and Romney constitute an intermediate cluster between the two major presidential sets, similar to the pattern displayed in the correlation matrix of Table 3. McCarthy is closest to the Democrats, Romney to the Republicans, and Rockefeller midway between them. Ideologically these candidates are as liberal as the Democratic cluster in some respects though less liberal in others. The reasons for the central location of these candidates will be formulated more precisely when we expand the scope of this analysis to include various political attitude measures.

<sup>13</sup> The terms used are those suggested by Kruskal for the evaluation of various stress values.

<sup>14</sup> The exact details of such a solution should not be overinterpreted. Adjacent points, such as Johnson, Kennedy, and Muskie, might switch positions with one another if alternative assumptions had been made in the analysis. Thus small differences in the solution space should not be given too much credence. However, the gross features of the structure of the space—particularly clusters of points in that space—are generally invariant under the uncertainties governing this analysis.

INTERVIEWER: TAKE SOME TIME TO EXPLAIN HOW THE THERMOMETER WORKS, SHOWING R THE WAY IN WHICH THE DEGREE LABELS CAN HELP HIM LOCATE AN INDIVIDUAL, SUCH AS GEORGE WALLACE.

	Rating		Rating
a. George Wallace	_____	g. Lyndon Johnson	_____
b. Hubert Humphrey	_____	h. George Romney	_____
c. Richard Nixon	_____	i. Robert Kennedy	_____
d. Eugene McCarthy	_____	j. Edmund Muskie	_____
e. Ronald Reagan	_____	k. Spiro Agnew	_____
f. Nelson Rockefeller	_____	l. Curtis LeMay	_____




FIGURE 1. A Unidimensional View of the Candidate Space.

While Figure 1 provides the best fitting unidimensional ordering, we do not regard the candidate space as essentially unidimensional. The unidimensional solution distorts several of the relationships between the candidates. In particular the rule of monotonicity between the correlations and the corresponding interpoint distances demands even greater separation between Nixon and Wallace. It is useful to consider the ordering of the candidates on different possible continua. Nixon would be at the opposite end from the Democrats on a party identification dimension whereas Wallace alone would be at the opposite end from the Democrats on an issue continuum such as civil rights. Further separation between

Nixon and Wallace is needed if both of these orderings are to co-exist.

The solution in two dimensions is shown in Figure 2. The four clusters of candidates are again evident and one can still separate the various parties in the space. The added dimension resolves some of the discrepancies in the one dimensional solution. The axes chosen for Figure 2 are intended to simplify the interpretation of this solution.<sup>15</sup> The horizontal dimension runs

<sup>15</sup> In technical terms, we have employed a varimax rotation around the centroid of the space in order to approximate a simple structure solution. Multidimensional scaling solutions can be rotated




FIGURE 2. The Candidate Space in Two Dimensions.

from the Democrats and Rockefeller to Wallace. This ordering seems to correspond roughly to a left-right pattern or even to a Wallace-non-Wallace dimension. The vertical dimension runs from the Democratic candidates to the American Independent and Republican Party candidates. The ordering here might correspond roughly with party identification and attitudes on social welfare policy or government power more generally. We shall not justify the exact ordering on these axes but will further explore this question in the next section.<sup>16</sup>

freely because the choice of axes in the multidimensional space is arbitrary. The arbitrary determination of the axes suggests that the overall structure of the space should be given the most emphasis or, alternatively, the relation of the candidate items to validating attitude items located in the same space should be stressed.

<sup>16</sup> The solution in Figure 2 still portrays the rela-

The solutions we have seen do no great damage to our intuitive views of the candidates, but

tionships between the parties more accurately than it portrays those within the parties. In particular it understates the distance between McCarthy and Johnson. The three dimensional solution resolves these remaining discrepancies, with the third dimension providing separation within each party. This dimension divides Johnson from Kennedy and McCarthy among the Democrats and divides Nixon and Agnew from Rockefeller, Romney, and Reagan. In each case it separates the "middle-of-the-road" candidates in the party from the more liberal and conservative candidates. Those controlling their parties' organizations are divided from those who opposed their parties' establishments. While the three dimensional solution provides an "excellent" fit to the data (stress = .018), this third dimension yields very little explanatory power so we shall not consider it further.

TABLE 4. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL ATTITUDES

	Party	Full Employment	Gov't Power	Urban Unrest	Civil Rights	Chicago	Vietnam	Foreign Aid
Party identification—Democratic*	x							
Favor government guarantee of full employment	.20	x						
Federal government is not powerful enough	.29	.26	x					
Solve urban unrest by social solutions rather than force	.15	.24	.15	x				
Favor desegregation	.05	.17	.16	.26	x			
Too much force was used in Chicago	.05	.20	.06	.36	.34	x		
Favor withdrawal from Vietnam rather than escalation	.02	.16	.11	.29	.13	.24	x	
Favor foreign aid	.04	.13	.08	.12	.22	.22	.00	x

\* Labels for the issue items indicate the direction of their scoring.

looking at the candidates by themselves provides us with precious few handles by which to interpret the dimensions of the space. Therefore we shall consider the relations of attitudes toward the candidates to attitudes on issues and parties as a means of further explaining the candidate dimensions. This will allow us to note the similarities in the ways in which respondents view candidates, issues, and parties and will simplify the interpretation of the dimensions of the candidate space itself.

### III. CANDIDATES, ISSUES, AND PARTIES

Political attitudes were important in the 1968 election and, in addition, seemed to stress other issues than those emphasized in earlier decades. The electorate of the 1960's was concerned with problems of the cities, civil rights, Vietnam, protest, and law and order.<sup>17</sup> Civil rights was not a new concern, but it now became associated with urgent new problems of domestic life and foreign affairs. The correlations in Table 4 show that this new issue cluster has a cohesive charac-

<sup>17</sup> Approximately three-quarters of the electorate listed one of these as the major problem facing the government when asked just before the 1968 election. See also Converse, *et al.*, "Continuity and Change in American Politics."

ter of its own and is little related to partisan identification or to the classic social welfare and foreign policy areas. Past voting studies have highlighted the issues of social welfare and foreign policy, showing the two to be independent of each other and the former to be related to party identification.<sup>18</sup> Respondents still mentioned them in 1968 but they, by no means, had the salience and priority of the more contemporary focused issues. The other political orientation of concern, party identification, remained stable in 1968 compared to earlier years, but its lack of association with the new issue cluster may have dimmed its relevance in this election.

We shall now relate these attitudes directly to the full candidate space. We have chosen four items for closer analysis as being representative of the traditional party and social welfare areas and the new domestic and foreign concerns—the items being party identification and attitudes on full employment, solutions to urban unrest, and Vietnam, respectively.<sup>19</sup> Multidimensional scal-

<sup>18</sup> Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, *The American Voter*, Ch. 9.

<sup>19</sup> The questions on urban unrest and Vietnam analyzed here and in Tables 6 and 7 below were devised by R. A. Brody, B. I. Page, S. Verba, and J. Laulicht.




FIGURE 3. Candidates and Attitudes in Two Dimensional Space.

ing of these attitude items in both their original and reflected forms together with the candidate evaluations yields the solution shown in Figure 3.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> The associated stress value is .106, indicating some difficulty in satisfying the monotonic constraints. The need to satisfy the additional relationships between the attitude items and the candidate ratings has affected somewhat the structure of the candidate space embedded in Figure 3, though we would regard this candidate space as being essentially similar to that of Figure 2. The attitude items were included in both their original and reflected forms in order to facilitate comparisons of their locations with respect to both liberal and conservative candidates. While the candidate ratings have a natural direction, the scoring of these attitude items is arbitrary. Therefore it makes sense to consider both possible directions for each item. Unlike some other analysis procedures, the multi-

The vertical dimension of Figure 3 is basically partisan. The classic party identification item is associated with this dimension. Also the two partisan clusters have their highest loadings on it. The social welfare issue is quite close to this dimension—a result which fits well with the fact that party identification and social welfare concerns both grew out of the economic problems of the 1930's. Nixon is nearest to Republican identification while Reagan is closest to the conservative pole of social welfare, indicating that so-

dimensional scaling model does not force the two poles of an item to be exactly opposite one another in the space, though we find this to be approximately true. If an item is related to a given axis, its alternative scorings would be at opposite ends of that axis. Both poles of an item unrelated to a dimension would project on approximately the same place on that dimension.

cial welfare is tied to party though they are not completely identical.

The horizontal dimension involves the more immediate problems of 1968. Vietnam attitudes are associated most strongly with this dimension and the urban unrest attitudes are also related to it. The American Independent Party candidates and McCarthy, Rockefeller, and Romney have their highest loadings here. The conservative ends of the Vietnam and urban unrest items are near Wallace and LeMay. The liberal end of Vietnam is nearest to McCarthy and Kennedy while the liberal end of urban unrest is closest to Kennedy and Humphrey. Respondents thus did differentiate within this set of issues, though overall perceptions of candidates on urban unrest and Vietnam are quite similar. Differentiation in respondents' perceptions was also evident in their contrasts of Wallace and LeMay with the rest of the candidates. While there have been previous indications of a Wallace-non-Wallace dimension, it is now apparent that such a dimension has issue bases and that some liberal candidates are also linked with this issue continuum.

The two dimensional space also comments on the relative positioning of the major party nominees. The basic opposition of Humphrey and Nixon along the vertical dimension points to the importance of party identification in molding evaluations of the candidates. Differences between them on the issue dimension were not considerable, but the bonds of traditional party identification kept them from moving toward a "tweedledee-tweedledum" position in the space. Even the intrusion of an issue dimension in 1968 did not eliminate the differences due to partisanship. In fact the partisan dimension is of somewhat greater importance than the issue dimension even in the full candidate space, though this should not be given too much emphasis since the measure of importance is considerably affected by the somewhat arbitrary selection of candidates included in the thermometer question.

The two dimensions of Figure 3 represent two basic political continua. The vertical axis corresponds to the partisan issues which divided the old left and the old right. The horizontal axis corresponds to the issues which divide the new left and the new right, issues which are not linked closely to the partisan attachments of an earlier generation. It is true that a very broad left-right dimension divides the issues and candidates in the upper-left corner of the diagram from those in the lower-right. Indeed such a continuum would correspond to the ordering of the candidates in Figure 1. However, the complexities of 1968 were too great for a good fit

with a single left-right dimension. Equally important, issues apart from traditional partisan identification were critical in the determination of attitudes toward several of the candidates. The electorate did adapt to changing circumstances in its evaluation of the candidates. Indeed, the mapping of Figure 3 suggests considerable flexibility and sensitivity on the part of the electorate.

Nevertheless the data cannot indicate whether these dimensions are unique to the 1968 election or would have been found in a similar analysis of other recent presidential elections. The "new issues" dimension is most likely to be a recent development while the dimension similar to party identification probably has had a longer existence. Whether there is always a continuum relating to the issues of the day in addition to a long-term party identification dimension cannot be answered by the analysis of a single election. The closeness of the social welfare and party identification items might mean that an "issues of the day" factor would not appear when an election is fought along traditional social welfare lines. The issues of the day might form the basis of candidacies in any election, though we would regard the sharp dichotomization of the dimensions in this election as indicating that more fundamental concerns were at work in 1968.

The dimensional analysis has shown the critical roles of parties and issues in molding popular perceptions of the candidates in 1968. The impact of these factors on the specific candidates must be detailed as must the conditions governing their impact. The two factors could work together or separately, depending on the circumstances of the election year and its cast of leading characters. We shall now concentrate on how these factors operate on each of our twelve candidates and how they interrelate in their effects. We shall later specify the probable conditions under which the different dimensions of candidate evaluation are used, leading to a working knowledge of the formation of candidate evaluations.

The first factor of importance is party. Our suggestion that it is a crucial variable is not exactly novel. Past voting studies have shown that specific perceptions of the nominees are often expressed in terms of party ties. The authors of *The American Voter* have particularly detailed the respondents' likes and dislikes of the nominees in these terms, most notably in the Eisenhower-Stevenson elections of 1952 and 1956. They found that party provided an important basis for the evaluations of these two men—perhaps initially in 1952 because it was one of the few cues available to evaluate such new person-

alities on the national political scene. They also traced the impact of party on reactions to the personal characteristics of the two nominees and found the expected partisan slope, adherents of each party evaluating their party's candidate more favorably than did adherents of the opposite party.<sup>21</sup>

The theme of party influence was carried further in the literature by Converse and Dupeux as they probed the complexities of the Eisenhower case.<sup>22</sup> They point out that Eisenhower was long seen apart from the party system and that Democratic leaders, at least at one time, hoped he would run for office as the candidate of their party. Reaction to him in the 1952 campaign was influenced by his eventual choice of the Republican banner. Yet Converse and Dupeux argue that there was no reason to feel that admiration for him had previously followed partisan lines and if Eisenhower had chosen the Democratic party, "we may assume the relationship would have rotated in the opposite direction: strong Republicans would have decided they disliked Eisenhower."<sup>23</sup> Party was thus seen as a strong and inexorable influence on the perceptions of the candidates.

Given such research, one should expect that party would be a major orientation to the candidates in 1968. After all, most of the candidates had long backgrounds in partisan politics and were known as national political figures prior to the 1968 campaign. People like Humphrey, Nixon, and Johnson were considered leaders of their parties and had all held national elective office. Kennedy was well-known as a key participant in his brother's Democratic administration, for being a prominent Democratic senator, and for taking his campaign in 1968 directly to the people. McCarthy, too, was a Democratic office-holder and conducted a quite visible campaign in his party's primaries. On the Republican side, Rockefeller had participated in national campaigns for his party's nomination since 1960 and Romney, also a governor of a large state, was considered by many to be the front-runner for his party's top prize until the start of the 1968 primary season. Reagan did not mount a national campaign but received

considerable publicity as a result of his political success in California. Muskie and Agnew were less well-known nationally but were naturally tied to and identified with their party's presidential ticket, awareness of them increasing as the campaign progressed. Only Wallace and LeMay provided a contrast to this general theme in publicly disavowing the two party system and running a third party campaign. With that exception, the candidates of 1968 had direct partisan connections and were generally familiar in that guise. In a very real sense, the party cue was available longer to these men than to either Eisenhower or Stevenson in 1952. Whether they actually were so perceived, however, is a question to which we now turn our attention.

Table 5 suggests the effects of party identification on the candidate evaluations. Partisan slopes are clearly evident for several of the candidates. Strong Democrats gave the highest mean scores to Humphrey, Muskie, Kennedy, and Johnson while strong Republicans gave them the lowest mean scores. This pattern is exactly reversed for Agnew, Nixon, and Reagan. The difference in means between the strong identifier groups for these candidates is 18-37 percent, indicating an effect of considerable magnitude. These seven partisan candidates represent a mixture of those who have been on the national scene the longest and shortest times. In some instances the candidates have long been identified with the parties while in other cases party is one of the few available cues for candidate evaluation. The patterns shown for the latter type of candidate are similar to those found for Eisenhower and Stevenson. But while all seven of these political personalities had sizable party slopes, there is a marked tendency in Table 5 for candidates having been on the national scene the longer time and candidates associated with higher partisan office to have the larger partisan slopes in the group.

A marked departure from partisan guidelines appears for the remaining candidates. Wallace and LeMay, in particular, were seen in relatively non-partisan terms. Their levels of strength, when weak and strong identifiers of each party are combined, are about the same among Democrats and Republicans, indicating that on balance they were not seen as Democrats regardless of Wallace's past partisan ties. Being third party candidates, it is also not surprising that support for them varied inversely with strength of party identification and that, as a result, their greatest backing came from among those not identifying with either major party. There may even have been a shift of Wallace supporters into the ranks of the Inde-

<sup>21</sup> Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, *The American Voter*, pp. 128-131.

<sup>22</sup> P. E. Converse and G. Dupeux, "De Gaulle and Eisenhower: The Public Image of the Victorious General," translated in A. Campbell, P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller, and D. E. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 292-345.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 325.

TABLE 5. MEAN SCORES OF CANDIDATES  
BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION

	Strong Demo- crats	Weak Demo- crats	Inde- pendents	Weak Repub- licans	Strong Repub- licans	Eta*
Humphrey	81.1	66.0	54.5	50.8	43.6	.46
Muskie	73.8	60.8	58.4	55.5	51.8	.31
Kennedy	81.9	72.7	65.8	61.2	55.5	.32
Johnson	75.7	63.3	51.5	48.0	42.3	.43
McCarthy	55.7	53.8	55.2	56.9	50.6	.08
Rockefeller	54.5	51.7	52.6	58.0	54.0	.09
Romney	49.5	47.4	48.3	49.1	53.8	.10
Agnew	43.8	48.3	50.3	56.0	61.6	.25
Nixon	54.9	61.3	66.8	77.1	84.2	.40
Reagan	41.2	46.9	50.2	53.7	60.2	.25
LeMay	28.4	37.6	38.5	34.6	35.0	.14
Wallace	24.3	35.2	35.5	32.1	23.6	.16
N's	238-	298-	356-	163-	125-	1192-
	267	331	381	180	132	1291

\* The eta statistic indicates the degree of relationship between the independent variable (party identification) and the candidate's ratings.

pendents, although the small differences observed in Table 5 suggest that only a few members of the electorate probably made such a change. The other candidates—McCarthy, Rockefeller, and Romney—received approximately equal backing from all classes of identifiers. This means that their appeal was not strongly partisan and consequently did not reap the usual advantages of partisan support. This finding is more unusual than the Wallace-LeMay pattern since the three had definite partisan backgrounds and were identified with the race for their parties' nominations. What remains to be considered is the bases of support which these five candidates employed instead of the usual partisan appeal. Conversely, it will also be important to clarify why the other candidates were seen as "party people" and to determine in what other ways they were viewed.

To explore these questions further, we have examined the relationships between the scores given to the candidates and two of the new issue items. The first item had the respondent indicate on a seven point scale what he considered to be "the best way to deal with the problem of urban unrest and rioting." The scale ranged from solving the underlying problems of poverty and unemployment at one end to using all available force at the other. This "urban unrest" question evoked some of the respondent's basic feelings toward the subjects of law and order, militancy, civil rights, and social welfare. Table 6 shows the mean scores given the candidates by attitudes on urban unrest and enables us to look for "issue slopes" in the same manner that we

looked for partisan slopes in the previous table.<sup>24</sup>

The data in Table 6 indicate that some of the more partisan candidates were also seen in issue terms. For instance, Humphrey, Kennedy, and Johnson were evaluated more highly by those in favor of solving the problems of our domestic life by social justice instead of law and order. Muskie also followed suit, but not as much so as his Democratic colleagues. Of the partisan Republicans, Reagan was liked most by those advocating the use of all available force, though the difference is not a sizable one. Feelings toward Nixon and Agnew also tended to be more favorable on the "law and order" side, but their strength is nearly constant across the continuum. Such slopes show that the strength of the issue factor varied for the partisan candidates, although each candidate was evaluated higher on one side of the continuum than the other. A comparison of these results with Table 5 reveals that the urban unrest issue is not as important as party in its effects on this set of candidate ratings.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> The seven point scales on this and the next issue were collapsed into five point scales by combining the two extreme positions at each end.

<sup>25</sup> In order to gauge the relative importance of these effects, it is necessary to consider the slopes, the distribution of cases on the issue and party variables, and the curvilinear tendencies for some of the candidates. The eta coefficient takes all of these matters into account and, hence, forms the basis for our judgments of relative importance. When squared, it relates the proportion of variance in a candidate's ratings explained by a given factor. Eta values for two variables can be com-

TABLE 6. MEAN SCORES OF CANDIDATES BY  
ATTITUDES ON URBAN UNREST

	Solve problems of poverty and unemployment			Use all available force	Eta
Humphrey	71.5	67.7	59.1	51.7	50.2
Muskie	66.2	66.8	60.4	55.6	54.2
Kennedy	78.6	72.3	67.5	59.3	61.0
Johnson	64.8	62.3	58.7	49.8	48.9
McCarthy	60.0	58.3	52.3	52.0	50.2
Rockefeller	56.0	56.6	54.7	50.6	49.6
Romney	48.9	52.6	51.6	48.3	43.9
Agnew	48.6	48.5	51.3	52.6	51.4
Nixon	63.2	63.9	68.8	69.9	66.8
Reagan	43.2	47.4	51.3	51.4	54.3
LeMay	26.3	30.5	35.1	37.9	47.7
Wallace	18.2	24.4	28.9	38.5	51.1
N's	358-	124-	343-	115-	224-
	389	129	369	126	249
					1173-
					1261

TABLE 7. MEAN SCORES OF CANDIDATES  
BY ATTITUDES ON VIETNAM

	Immediate Withdrawal		Complete Military Victory		Eta
Humphrey	64.4	65.8	64.8	63.1	.19
Muskie	62.5	63.5	63.0	63.0	.12
Kennedy	76.3	73.2	70.6	67.2	.20
Johnson	57.0	60.8	62.6	58.8	.14
McCarthy	61.5	58.9	55.6	52.5	.20
Rockefeller	54.0	59.1	55.2	55.8	.12
Romney	46.7	50.2	51.5	51.3	.12
Agnew	46.8	49.1	50.8	51.6	.10
Nixon	61.9	69.1	67.1	68.5	.11
Reagan	43.0	47.6	49.4	51.8	.16
LeMay	26.4	28.4	31.8	33.9	.27
Wallace	21.8	20.5	25.7	30.8	.31
N's	246-	95-	346-	125-	336- 1152-
	275	101	369	133	357 1234

Perhaps the most interesting patterns in the table concern the candidates lacking partisanship. Issue colorations were evident for most of these individuals. Wallace and LeMay, in particular, were supported by those wanting all available force with a strong slope toward the opposite end. The difference in means for Wallace between the two extreme categories was 33 percent, the largest such difference in the table. McCarthy, by contrast, was seen as a liberal with a definite tendency existing for people to evaluate him, as Humphrey, Kennedy, and Johnson, on the social justice end of the urban continuum. Rockefeller and Romney also did best on the social justice side, though the differences are not large which may be due, in part, to their lower level of saliency among the public. The scores given to these five candidates have a greater relation to this dimension than to party identification. The overall public ranking of these and the other candidates along this dimension fits very well with the interpretations given by political commentators. In some cases we are not dealing with large effects, but there is evidence that this dimension was quite salient to the public and that they could accurately locate the candidates on it.

The other overriding issue in 1968 was certainly the Vietnam war. Following a format similar to the urban unrest question, respondents were asked what action they felt the United States should take in Vietnam. The choices ranged from immediate withdrawal at one end to winning a complete military victory at the other. Table 7 shows the mean scores given the candidates by attitudes on Vietnam. The war

pared to ascertain which factor, issue or party is the more important for the candidate of concern.

generally affected ratings of the partisan candidates less than did either party or urban issues. Still, some differences on Vietnam did appear among the partisans with higher ratings for Kennedy among the "doves" and somewhat higher scores for Reagan and Agnew among the "hawks." Humphrey and, to a lesser extent, Muskie fared better on the dove side, but their ratings fell off at the extreme. Johnson manifested another pattern—those in the middle of the scale liked him most and then his support trailed off as one moves to the more extreme categories. This fits well with Johnson's "middle-of-the-road" handling of the war and indeed the two extremes of this scale were intended as alternatives to his policies. Nixon's level of support varied little with Vietnam policy except among strong doves who tended to rate him lower. His announcement of a "plan to end the war" without indicating the nature of that plan appears to have hurt him only among doves.

Vietnam attitudes tend to have more impact on the ratings of the remaining candidates than party and are almost on a par with those on the urban issue. Leading off this parade of effects are Wallace and LeMay who are once again found at one of the extremities of the continuum. The two definitely show the strongest issue slopes on the "hawkish" side of the Vietnam question, pointing up the way in which they embodied the issue scene of 1968. Evaluations of McCarthy were also affected by attitudes on the war with the Senator receiving his greatest support among those wishing immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. There is every indication here that his candidacy was visible and that he did succeed in tying it to the war issue. Rockefeller's and Romney's patterns are more ambiguous, again possibly due to their lower level of saliency. Romney's best standing was among those favoring "middle-of-the-road" policies toward the war, possibly suggesting that he experienced difficulty in communicating his war position to the public. Rockefeller's virtual silence on the war may explain the irregularities in his pattern of support, though he definitely did garner greater backing among doves. Basically the data fit usual statements of the twelve candidates' policies quite well. The effects of Vietnam attitudes tend to be smaller than those associated with urban problems, but this may well be explained by smaller differences between the candidates and less clarity on their part in the statement of exact positions on the war.

The data presented here show that some of the candidates not seen in partisan terms are instead associated with the issues of the times. In order for a candidate to become strongly identi-

fied with an issue position, it is necessary for him to be salient to the public and for him to take a definite stand on the issue. Wallace and LeMay provide the strongest contrasts in data patterning since they were not partisan candidates and did become strongly identified with the important issues. McCarthy, Rockefeller, and Romney also were differentiated on issue bases, though not as strongly so as Wallace and LeMay because of their lower salience and their less definite positions on some issues. While an elite audience would generally recognize sharper issue positions for these three candidates, their limited salience to the mass public dampened public perceptions of these positions so that only relatively mild reverberations of their issue stands are evident in the data.

Among the partisan candidates, issues were not always relevant, but some contrasts do appear. The Democratic hard core—Kennedy, Johnson, Humphrey, and Muskie—registered moderate issue effects, particularly on solutions to urban problems. Reagan alone among the Republican candidates was seen in fairly distinct issue terms. But generally assessments of the partisan candidates were not necessarily based on current issues whereas the evaluations of the non-party candidates were related to such issues. That issues can be of the same order of importance as party in determining attitudes toward candidates, even candidates for the nominations of the major parties, is significant.

The impact of party and issue factors on perceptions of the candidates has been noted and detailed. The next step is to suggest conditions under which these two factors operate in the molding of candidate orientation. Party seems to be a useful cue for candidate evaluation when the individual is a new candidate without well-known policy stands, as in the case of Eisenhower, Stevenson, Agnew, and Muskie. Party will also loom important as a determinant of ratings when the candidate is a well-known national leader of his party, e.g., Humphrey, Nixon, Johnson, and Kennedy. The candidates of the major parties may still be perceived in issue as well as party terms; Kennedy and Reagan provide examples, though we find them viewed significantly more in the latter than in the former vein. Candidacies based mainly on issues are also possible, even in the major parties. A candidate without a decidedly partisan national reputation may distinguish himself on an issue basis, with little regard to conventional party lines. Wallace and LeMay demonstrate this possibility as third party candidates. McCarthy and, to a lesser extent, Rockefeller and Romney also tend to exhibit the patterning of

an issue-based candidate. The conditions making such issue candidacies viable remain to be considered.

#### IV. AN ERA OF INCREASING IDEOLOGICAL FOCUS

Two ideal types of "ideological focus" have been distinguished by Donald E. Stokes. Some periods of time can be characterized by "strong ideological focus" with political controversy "focused on a single, stable issue domain which presents an ordered-dimension that is perceived in common terms by leaders and followers." By contrast, a period of "weak ideological focus" would be one in which political conflict is "diffused over a number of changing issue concerns which rarely present position-dimensions and which are perceived in different ways by different political actors."<sup>26</sup> The nature of candidacies is basically dependent on the degree of ideological focus; viable issue candidacies require the sharp issue conflicts of periods of strong ideological focus. This election must be viewed in the broader perspective of the nature of party conflict in the last generation in order to determine the impetus for issue candidacies in 1968. This will lead us to an ultimate consideration of the future shape of party competition.

The contemporary period has been typified by the conditions of weak ideological focus and this is particularly true of the 1950's. While there were "issues" of a sort in that decade, they tended not to be position issues. One doubts whether the public perceived the Taft-Eisenhower contest in 1952, the Stevenson, Kefauver, Russell, Harriman, and Barkley contests of 1956, or the Eisenhower-Stevenson elections in strong issue terms. In particular Eisenhower and Stevenson did not emerge on the national political scene as the embodiments of strong issue positions. In periods of weak ideological focus, one expects that the candidates will be more party-based than issue-based. The candidates, particularly the new candidates without a partisan reputation, will be more positively evaluated by the identifiers of their own party since there are few competitive cues available.

The degree of ideological focus of American politics has been low since the period of the New Deal. "Then, more than now, the intervention of government in the domestic economy and related social problems provided a position-dimension that could organize the competition of par-

<sup>26</sup> D. E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," p. 376. "Position-dimensions" involve dimensions of conflict on which political actors—voters and parties—can and do take different policy stands.

ties and the motivation of electors."<sup>27</sup> What is remarkable is that the social welfare questions which realigned the parties in the 1930's still constitute the basis of party identification regardless of the many changes in our life since then. The stability of partisan loyalties is such that it does not change until the circumstances of the day force such a change.

The stability of partisanship at the mass level has a parallel among the party leaders. The electorate maintains its loyalties, in part, because the party leaders keep their doctrines relatively fixed. The parties originally became differentiated with respect to certain issues, such as social welfare. The differences on these issues are maintained by the parties in order to keep their underlying group support, though these differences may be muted in order to gain electoral advantage.

It is in periods of strong ideological focus that this stability is most seriously threatened. A set of issues may accumulate with little regard to conventional party lines. The parties tend to avoid involvement with new position issues for fear of losing their base of support, instead maneuvering to establish somewhat similar positions on these issues. This allows minor parties to take advantage of the new issues, at least for the short run. If the new position issues permit the minor parties to make a noticeable dent into the normal vote of the major parties and if furthermore these issues do not show signs of receding, the major parties shift their stands on these issues. The resulting changes in group loyalties betoken a realignment of the parties.<sup>28</sup> Those first joining the electorate during a period of strong ideological focus are less tied to traditional party lines and are often most affected by the new issues; thus the addition of young voters to the system can help provide the momentum needed for a realignment. Issue-based candidacies are more likely in a period of strong ideological focus; the actual nomination of an issue-based candidate by a major party can provide the final spur needed for the realignment to take place. Our political system is stable because few issues are of the magnitude necessary to cause a realignment, but they are not totally absent from the political scene.

Civil rights is one issue which could cause a realignment. It formed the basis of a regional third-party movement in 1948, but no lasting

change resulted. The Supreme Court opinions of the 1950's increased the immediacy of the issue. The major parties first became actively involved in the issue in the 1964 election, but the basic problem could still be geographically isolated. By the 1968 election, however, civil rights was a national problem. Furthermore, the civil rights problem fit into a more general syndrome which also included riots in the urban ghetto, campus unrest, protests against the Vietnam war, disorders on the streets of Chicago during the Democratic convention, and the general "law and order" theme. The establishment candidates in the major parties did not take sharply different positions on these issues, basing their appeals instead on conventional issues and party ties. Neither the Republicans nor the Democrats moved to a position on the new issues which would satisfy the extremists on either side, though their differences on the core civil rights problem were sufficient for black Americans to have no doubt as to their direction.

The echoes of these developments are evident in our data. We have found that a new set of issues has emerged, quite distinct from both social welfare and party identification. The civil rights issue of the previous decade provides the core of this new issue cluster, but further domestic and foreign problems are now associated with it. The independence of this new set of issues from the traditional concerns was particularly evident in the candidate/attitude space of Figure 3. Since a new position-dimension emerged at the mass level without the nominees of the major parties taking very different stands on it, a minor party emerged at one end of the dimension. Candidates associated with the liberal end of this dimension unsuccessfully contested for their parties' nominations, but chose not to take their fight to the electorate with a fourth party movement, at least not in 1968.

If our statement of the development of a new issue area independent of conventional party lines is correct, we are left speculating as to the shape of the political future. The new issues could recede in urgency by 1972. This could occur with reference to Vietnam, but seems less probable with regard to the other issues. It is always possible that the civil rights problem will become less urgent for a short period of time, but the long-term trend seems to be one of greater urgency. Protest, the complaints of youth, and the law and order theme are likely to become familiar parts of the political landscape. If indeed the issues do maintain their level of urgency, we may see some efforts toward party realignment by the 1972 election. Efforts toward reform of Democratic party procedures are al-

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> A classification of elections in terms of maintaining, deviating, and realigning elections is given in Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, *The American Voter*, pp. 531-538.

ready suggesting the feasibility of such a realignment.

The changes in the political horizon have a particularly important effect on the youth. Many have been directly affected by the new issues and all have witnessed a more vigorous political climate than that of the previous generation. Not having long participated in the political system, they tend to be less firmly identified with a party and less firmly committed to the parties than are their elders. The three party race of 1968 along with the new issue dimension and the issue candidacies may have further delayed the first real commitment to the party system for many young adults. As a result the pool of young voters who may enter the political system for the first time in the 1972 election includes more than the usual number of delayed entries. Additionally that pool will be larger than in most recent years because of the effects of the post-war "baby boom." That many of the new young voters will be veterans of the Vietnam conflict introduces another note of uncertainty. Taken together these elements point to a potential increase in the fluidity in the electoral system in 1972.

Thus the 1964 and 1968 elections could well constitute the prelude for a series of changes of a scope more vast than those to which voting studies have become accustomed. A deviating election such as 1968 may mark the end of a political era, though it would be too early to suggest the outline of a new one. In particular, the seeming stability of party identification may just mask an increasing irrelevance of tradi-

tional party ties during a period of growing ideological focus when some of those ties are becoming unhinged. This election was marked by events having theoretical importance—a new issue dimension developed, issue candidates emerged in the major parties, and a third party made a sizable showing. The voting patterns of significant groups in the electorate, particularly blacks, seem destined for a meaningful change from their patterns in the 1950's. Only time will tell whether a lasting reorientation of American politics occurs along these lines, but a considerable change in the panorama of American politics seems likely even if a full realignment is avoided.

There are two major dimensional antecedents of candidate evaluation. Party provides a basic dimensional antecedent, especially during periods of weak ideological focus when people unknown on the national political scene are nominated by their parties and also when the party leaders fight a rear-guard action against a realignment of the parties along the lines of the issues of the day. However, there is also room for issue dimensions, particularly in periods of strong ideological focus. Minor parties may grow up at the poles of such issue dimensions, though one would expect realignment of the major parties if those issue dimensions remain vigorous for any period of time. Party and issues thus provide two basic mechanisms of candidate evaluation. In 1968 we had both party-based candidates and issue-based candidates, a fact which in itself may be quite suggestive of the future of American politics.

## APPENDIX

As you know, there were many people mentioned this past year as possible candidates for President by the political parties. We would like to get your feelings toward some of these people.

I have here a card (INTERVIEWER HANDS OVER CARD #5) on which there is something that looks like a thermometer. We call it a "feeling thermometer" because it measures your feelings toward these people. You probably remember that we used something like this in our earlier interview with you.

Here's how it works. If you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward a person, then you should place him in the middle of the thermometer, at the

50 degree mark.

If you have a warm feeling toward a person, or feel favorably toward him, you would give him a score somewhere between 50° and 100°, depending on how warm your feeling is toward that person.

On the other hand, if you don't feel very favorably toward a person—that is, if you don't care too much for him—then you would place him somewhere between 0° and 50°.

Of course, if you don't know too much about a person, just tell me and we'll go on to the next name.

Our first person is George Wallace. Where would you put him on the thermometer.